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STRUCTURAL STRENGTH:
RESOLVING A CIRCUIT SPLIT IN BOYLE v.
UNITED STATES WITH A PRAGMATIC PROOF

REQUIREMENT FOR RICO ASSOCIATED-INFACT ENTERPRISES
Michael Morrissey*
This Note addresses the circuit split among the U.S. Courts of Appeals
over whether proving an associated-in-factRICO enterpriserequiresproof
of some ascertainable structure distinct from the underlying pattern of
racketeering. After discussing the history of RICO and RICO enterprises,
this Note dissects the three-way circuit split and details the facts and
positions of Boyle v. United States. Finally, this Note argues that the U.S.
Supreme Court needs to resolve the split with the common-sense position
that some ascertainable-structureproof requirement is needed-although
the enterprise need not have a purpose distinct from the pattern of
racketeering-tobalance the potential dangers of RICO's overbreadth with
the need to combat the dangersfor which RICO was enacted.
INTRODUCTION

Edmund Boyle does not deny that he was a serial bank burglar.I He is,
however, contesting his RICO convictions all the way to the U.S. Supreme
2
Court.
In 2003, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Boyle with
racketeering under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), 3 a statute that was enacted in 1970
4
as part of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).
The charges arose from Boyle's involvement in a bank burglary ring that
* B.A., University of Massachusetts; J.D. Candidate, 2010, Fordham University School of

Law. I thank Professor Ian Weinstein for his invaluable advice and guidance during the
writing process. Professor Julian Davis Mortenson also deserves thanks for his assistance.
Thank you to my parents, my sister and her family, and my wife, Alena, for their love and
encouragement.
1. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Boyle v. United States, No. 07-1309 (U.S.
Apr. 15, 2008), 2008 WL 1765769 ("The charges arose from the defendant's participation in
a bank burglary ring .....
2. See generally id.
3. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 2, Boyle, No. 07-1309 (U.S. July 2,
2008), 2008 WL 2676555.
4. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(2006)).
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the government called the "Boyle Crew." '5 Boyle "was one of a crew of
approximately eight men based in the New York City area who engaged in
a string of bank burglaries in at least five [s]tates between 1991 and 1999."6
Boyle was convicted by a jury in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York and sentenced to 151 months of imprisonment. 7 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction, but
vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing.8 Whether the "Boyle
Crew" meets the test of a critical element of RICO-an associated-in-fact
enterprise-is now a matter for the Supreme Court. 9
Finding the existence of an enterprise is crucial in any RICO
prosecution. 10 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962, the investment in,11
maintenance of an interest in, 12 or participation in the affairs of an
enterprise 1 3 are discrete kinds of prohibited conduct under RICO, as is the
conspiracy to do any of the aforementioned acts. 14 To state a claim under §
1962(c) of RICO, for example, the plaintiff or government must sufficiently
allege "(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through 1a6 pattern (4) of
racketeering activity,"' 5 be it a prosecution or civil action.
There are two types of enterprises identified by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4):
enterprises that are legal entities, and enterprises that are "associated in
fact."' 17 If an enterprise is a legal structure, person, or corporation, the
process of meeting the evidentiary requirement is simple-"prosecutors
have used an Office of a Governor, Prosecutor's Office, and other entities
as the enterprise for a RICO prosecution."' 8 When an enterprise is a legal
entity, the structure of the § 1962(c) offense is straightforward: "the
prohibited conduct is the commission of the predicate acts, with the relation
of the crimes to an enterprise serving as an aggravating factual
circumstance."'1 9 The fact that an enterprise exists-and that the given
5. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 3.
6. Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 3, at 2.
7. Id. at 1-2.
8. Id. at 2.
9. See Boyle v. United States, 283 F. App'x 825 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 129 S.
Ct. 29 (2008).
10. Ellen S. Podgor, State and Local Entities as RICO Enterprises: A Matter of
Perception, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 853, 854 (1996).
11. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2006)).
12. Id. at 855 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)).
13. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)).
14. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)).
15. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985) (referencing what a
violation of § 1962(c) requires). Section 1962(c) has been deemed RICO's "most important
liability provision." Frank D'Angelo, Note, Turf Wars: Street Gangs and the OuterLimits of
RICO's "Affecting Commerce" Requirement, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2075, 2076 (2008).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1964.
17. Id. § 1961(4).
18. White Collar Crime Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime
blog/2008/10/the-boyle-case.html (Oct. 14, 2008) [hereinafter The Boyle Case & RICO
Enterprises].
19. See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts 1X1 & IV, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 920, 942 (1987).
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criminal conduct relates to it-is usually easy to determine and thus not
contentious. 20 Satisfying the requirement is "[l]ess clear . . . when the
prosecution is premised upon2 1any ... group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity."
Since the group in Boyle was obviously not a legal entity, the issue was
whether the group was "associated-in-fact." Each crew member had a
specific job as a lookout or burglar; the members of the crew would conceal
their identities by referring to one another using aliases; and they often
utilized walkie-talkies. 22 The illicit gains were divided "based on the
amount of risk inherent in each participant's role." 23 On the other hand,
trial testimony presumably more favorable to Boyle established that the
Boyle Crew "was a loosely affiliated 'clique' of 'friends'-wholly lacking
role definition or organizational structure-who sporadically burgled night
24
deposit boxes in shifting combinations."
The evidentiary requirement for the "associated-in-fact" enterprise
element remains unsettled law and the subject of a deeply divided circuit
split. The question is a significant one, because prosecuting someone like
Boyle under RICO affords more serious penalties than would prosecuting
25
Boyle for the individual actions he undertook as part of the Boyle Crew.
In April 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed
that a RICO "enterprise" must have some ascertainable enterprise-like
structure in Limestone Development Corp. v. Village of Lemont,26 rejecting
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's contrary view in Odom v.
Microsoft Corp.27 in May 2007. The Supreme Court has finally decided to
resolve this circuit split, recently granting certiorari in Boyle v. United
States. 2 8
The question presented in Boyle is whether an associated-in-fact
enterprise needs an ascertainable structure apart from the pattern of
racketeering it engages in. 29 This highly anticipated decision has broad
implications on future prosecutions and civil liability under RICO. 30 A
case like Edmund Boyle's provides a clear example of the implications: the
narrowest reading of the enterprise element would raise the proof threshold
20. Id.
21. The Boyle Case & RICO Enterprises, supra note 18 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
22. Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 3, at 2.
23. Id.
24. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 3.
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2006) (establishing prison term of "not more than 20 years (or
for life if the violation is based on a racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty
includes life imprisonment)" for one criminal violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962); see also infra
note 184 and accompanying text.
26. 520 F.3d 797, 804 (7th Cir. 2008).
27. 486 F.3d 541, 551 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
28. 283 F. App'x 825 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted,129 S. Ct. 29 (2008).
29. See Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 3, at I.
30. See The Boyle Case & RICO Enterprises, supra note 18 ("[Boyle] will hopefully
resolve one of the nagging issues that pervades this area of the law.").
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to only those associations with a distinct ascertainable structure, while a
broad reading opens
the door for RICO prosecutions of groups with a less
31
rigid connection.
This Note addresses the aforementioned circuit split regarding the
evidentiary requirement of an associated-in-fact enterprise. Part I of this
Note examines the history of RICO, its purposes, and its policies. In
addition, this part explains what a RICO enterprise can be, particularly
examining associated-in-fact enterprises, some of the constitutional
misgivings over RICO, and the importance of prosecutorial discretion. Part
II of this Note dissects and analyzes the three-way circuit split over the
RICO associated-in-fact enterprise structure requirement. The facts and
positions of Boyle are also detailed in Part II.
In Part III, this Note argues that the Supreme Court needs to resolve the
split with the common-sense position that an ascertainable structure is
needed--even if the enterprise does not need to have a goal or purpose
separate from the pattern of racketeering itself. Such a resolution would
balance the potential dangers of RICO's overbreadth with the need to
combat the dangers for which RICO was enacted. Imposing structure will
help differentiate the common criminal from the racketeer and thus
establish proper remedies while not expanding RICO beyond recognition.
Not requiring a structure with a separate goal or purpose from the pattern of
racketeering itself, on the other hand, will allow RICO remedies against
completely illegitimate organizations-even those with less rigid
connections than those inherent in legal enterprises.
I. RICO

AND THE ENTERPRISE ELEMENT

To put this important issue in perspective, Part I discusses the history of
RICO and RICO enterprises. Part L.A examines the policies and purposes
behind RICO's enactment. Part I.B analyzes the enterprise requirement,
particularly focusing in on the distinction between legal-entity enterprises
and associated-in-fact enterprises.
Part L.C discusses potential
constitutional vagueness problems and prosecutorial discretion.
A. Policiesand Purposesof RICO
Organized crime in the United States is unquestionably as old as the
United States itself,32 so it is worthwhile to understand its history and the
33
longtime efforts to combat it.

31. See, e.g., United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1367 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Criminal
enterprises have less structure than legal ones. For formal relationships created by contract
and rule they substitute informal relationships based on kinship and friendship. It would be
ironic if the RICO statute, aimed primarily at criminal enterprises such as the Mafia and its
many petty imitators, was more effective against legal enterprises because the latter have a
more perspicuous, articulated structure." (citing FRANCIs A. J. IANNI & ELIZABETH REUSSIANNI, A FAMILY BUSINESS: KINSHIP AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN ORGANIZED CRIME

172 (1972))).

154, 157,
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RICO's genesis harkens back as far as the 1920s, when the coalescence
of negative societal factors led to the rise of organized crime. 34 Before
35
Prohibition, organized crime's widespread impact had not really been felt.
But while the problem grew, attempts to eliminate it by prosecuting
individual members for individual crimes turned out to be generally
36
ineffective.
The problem eventually became a front-burner issue in Washington,
D.C., where a number of senatorial and presidential committees and
commissions were formed to analyze organized crime and recommend
alternative ways to deal with it.3 7 In the 1950s, the Kefauver and
McClellan Committees revealed the structure of the Mafia and targeted the
organization's infiltration of legitimate businesses as a core problem. 38 In
1965, Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach was asked by President
39
Lyndon B. Johnson to helm a commission and further tackle the issue.
This President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, dubbed the Katzenbach Commission, delivered its report in 1967.40
Congress adopted many of the Commission's recommendations for federal
legislation, while other recommendations influenced state and local
41
actors.
Despite the sporadic recognition of more general organized criminal
groups, the Katzenbach Commission "clearly conceived of organized crime
as a single entity and directed its primary attention toward a single target:
the Italian syndicate it believed controlled organized crime." 42 The
Commission saw the Mafia's "increasing tendency to involve itself in
43
legitimate business and union activities" as a critical part of this threat.

32. Craig M. Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalizationof Crime, 22 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 213, 215 (1984).
33. See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 661, 662 n. 11 (1987) ("As a proper noun, 'Organized Crime' means to most

people a formally structured criminal syndicate, or even more specifically, the Sicilianderived 'La Cosa Nostra' or 'Mafia.' In a broader, common noun use, 'organized crime'
may be taken literally to mean any criminal activity that is 'organized,' that is, any crimes
committed by a relatively structured continuing group of individuals devoted to crime as a
profession.").

34. See D'Angelo, supra note 15, at 2080 (noting that "factors including increased
narcotic use, Prohibition, and the Great Depression contributed to the rise of organized
crime" (citing Bradley, supra note 32, at 225-29)).
35. Bradley, supra note 32, at 226 ("While America had organized crime before
[P]rohibition, it was more diverse,

loosely structured, and primarily

involved with

prostitution, gambling and political corruption on a local level. These activities did not
require large organizations.").
36. D'Angelo, supra note 15, at 2080.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Lynch, supra note 33, at 666.
41. Id. at 666 & n.23.
42. Id. at 672.
43. Id.
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However, the Katzenbach Commission "recommended no innovations in
44
the penal code."
In 1968, numerous anticrime bills were introduced by congressional
members, "including many that were specifically responsive to the
[Katzenbach] Commission's recommendations." 45 Two bills introduced
that year by Senator Roman Hruska are commonly considered to be
precursors to RICO. 4 6 "No action was taken on the bills" in the 1968
session of Congress, though. 47 In the next session of Congress, however,
Senator John L. McClellan "introduced a major bill containing most of the
48
organized crime recommendations of the Katzenbach Commission."
Senator McClellan spoke at length about the insidious nature of organized
crime and the ways to fight it through legislation. 49 Senator Hruska,
meanwhile, proposed a new bill that made clear that it was "aimed
specifically at racketeer infiltration of legitimate business. '50 The two men
teamed up and introduced a bill entitled the "Corrupt Organizations Act of
1969."51 The bill "was amended in numerous relatively minor respects as it
passed through the Senate and House Judiciary Committees," essentially
"all but identical to the final version of S.1861 that was enacted into law as
title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970."52
RICO was enacted as part of the larger Organized Crime Control Act
(OCCA) 53 and codified into law at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.54 Congress
stressed that the purpose of the Act was to "seek the eradication of
organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the
44. Id. at 671.
45. Id. at 673.
46. Id. One bill "would have amended the Sherman Antitrust Act to prohibit the
investment or use in one line of business of intentionally unreported income from another
line of business." Id. The other bill "created new civil and criminal penalties for the
investment of income derived from various specified criminal activities in a business
affecting interstate commerce." Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 675.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 676 (quoting 115 CONG. REc. 6993 (1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 676-77. When introducing the bill, Senator John McClellan left no doubt as to
its purposes. He said,
The problem, simply stated, is that organized crime is increasingly taking over
organizations in our country, presenting an intolerable increase in deterioration of
our Nation's standards. Efforts to dislodge them so far have been of little avail.
To aid in the pressing need to remove organized crime from legitimate
organizations in our country, I have thus formulated this bill. . . .This bill is
designed to attack the infiltration of legitimate business repeatedly outlined by
investigations of various congressional committees and the President's Crime
Commission.
Id. at 677 (quoting 115 CONG. REc. 9567 (1969)).
53. G. Robert Blakey & Scott D. Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO:
Reflections on Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be Effective
Only Against White-Collar Crime?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 526, 529 (1987).
54. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
(2006)).
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evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by
providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime." '55 In the Statement and
Findings of Purpose for the Act, Congress concluded that organized crime
kept spreading because of problems in gathering evidence, which impacted
the amount of legally admissible evidence that could be introduced in
attempts to punish organized crime members. 56 In addition, Congress
found that the "sanctions and remedies available to the Government are
unnecessarily limited in scope and impact. '' 57 Congress directed that RICO
"shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes," 58 a
59
directive that has been called a "mandate."
A key provision of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), states,
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs 60through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt.
As defined by RICO, racketeering encompasses a wide range of state and
federal offenses. 6 1 "RICO is a criminal and civil statute, with a criminal
cause of action and criminal penalties as well as a civil cause of action and
civil remedies." 62 These civil remedies include treble damages. 63 The
Supreme Court in United States v. Turkette64 accepted that the main
purpose of RICO was "to cope with the infiltration of legitimate
businesses" by organized crime. 6 5 However, some commentators argue that
it was not limited to that purpose or intended solely for "organized crime in
the classic mobster sense." 66 While the Supreme Court has noted that
55. 84 Stat. at 923 (Statement of Findings and Purpose).

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
§ 904(a), 84 Stat. at 947.
See Blakey & Cessar, supra note 53, at 532 (quoting United States v. Long, 651 F.2d

239, 241 (4th Cir. 1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

60. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006); see also D'Angelo, supra note 15, at 2076 ("[Section
1962(c)] contains the Act's federal 'jurisdictional hook'-its statutory anchor to Article I
congressional power.").
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). "Racketeering activity" includes many crimes along a
continuum between murder and wire and mail fraud. Id.
62. Ann B. Whitley, Note, Collective Institutional Guilt: The Emergence of
InternationalUnions' RICO Liabilityfor Local Union Crimes, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 291, 293
(1994); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-1964.
63. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Notwithstanding this harsh civil penalty, the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) has been called fundamentally a criminal
statute because "the racketeering activity giving rise to RICO liability must be criminal in
nature." Whitley, supra note 63, at 293 (quoting Klein v. King, No. C-88-3141 FMS, 1990
WL 61950, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
65. Id. at 591.
66. Blakey & Cessar, supra note 53, at 529 (quoting United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d
1026, 1030 (4th Cir. 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consider the opinion that

Congress enacted RICO "as a general reform designed to sanction 'enterprise criminality'
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67 RICO's uniquely broad scope has not been
"RICO is to be read broadly,"
68
acclaim.
universal
with
met
Even after extensive congressional consideration and compromise,
though, it has been said that "[t]he final version of RICO... does not
manifest a limited scope."' 69 And yet, Senator McClellan pointed out while
introducing section 1961 that "RICO was not intended to accomplish the
'eradication' of organized crime by itself."'70 Additionally, at least one
commentator notes that "nowhere in the legislative history is there even a
glimmer of an indication that RICO or any of its predecessors was intended
to impose additional criminal sanctions on racketeering
acts that did not
71
involve infiltration into legitimate business."
Judge Gerard E. Lynch of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York, in an exhaustive four-part series on RICO, 72 opines
that while "careful commentators have concluded that Congress intended
RICO as a specific response to the problem of criminal infiltration of
legitimate enterprises, courts, including the Supreme Court of the United
States, and at least one highly influential commentator have found in the
legislative history much broader purposes." 73 Moreover, they "have used
74
their findings to justify sweeping interpretations of the statute."

that is, patterns of racketeering activity committed by, through, or against an enterprise." Id.
(quoting G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations(RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminaland Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009,
1013-14 (1980)).
67. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985).
68. As one commentator notes, "a number of debatable uses of civil RICO exist."
Whitley, supra note 63, at 294. At least one other commentator has questioned whether "the
'rule of lenity' might play a role in the interpretation of RICO's provisions." Timothy A. Ita,
RICO-CriminalForfeitureof Proceeds of Racketeering Activity Under RICO: Russello v.
United States, 104 S. Ct. 296 (1983), 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 893, 920 (1984).
69. Ita, supra note 68, at 918 (citing United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 373 (1978)).
70. Lynch, supra note 33, at 680 (citing 115 CONG. REc. 9568 (1969)).
71. Id.
72. See generally id.; Lynch, supra note 19. Judge Gerard Lynch has been called a
"thoughtful jurist" whose work is "brilliant." The Boyle Case & RICO Enterprises, supra
note 18. However, his four-part treatment was criticized by at least one prominent scholar.
See Michael Goldsmith, RICO and Enterprise Criminality: A Response to GerardE. Lynch,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 774 (1988). But see Gerard E. Lynch, A Reply to Michael Goldsmith, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 802 (1988).
Judge Lynch is not the only current judge from the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York to weigh in on RICO; Judge Jed S. Rakoff also opined on the
controversial statute before he was appointed to the bench, writing in 1990 that RICO's
pattern and enterprise elements were unconstitutionally vague. See Jed S. Rakoff, The
Unconstitutionalityof RICO, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1990, at 3. For other RICO scholarship by
Judge Rakoff, see JED S. RAKOFF & HOWARD W. GOLDSTEIN, RICO: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
LAW AND STRATEGY (1989).
73. Lynch, supra note 33, at 664 (footnotes omitted). Judge Lynch was referring to
University of Notre Dame Law School Professor G. Robert Blakey, whose work is also cited
in this Note, see supra note 53; infra note 371, and who, elsewhere, has been called "the
father of RICO," see infra note 175. Professor Blakey's biography page notes that he is "the
nation's foremost authority on the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act," and
that his "extensive legislative drafting experience resulted in the passage of ... the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Title IX of which is known as 'RICO."' University of
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Judge Lynch concludes that "the latter view, which has had considerable
influence on the development of the law, is wrong, and the commentators
'75
who criticize it have presented their conclusions in rather summary form.
Judge Lynch's fastidious review of the evidence reveals that RICO's
primary use has been as a frontal attack on any and all organized crime, not
to prevent the mob from gaining access to legitimate organizations. 76 Judge
Lynch notes that, in theory, the executive branch can use an overly broad
statute to overpower or circumvent traditional, time-honored procedural,
jurisdictional, and sentencing safeguards and regulations "essentially
whenever it chooses, rais[ing] serious problems of legality and fair notice,
and creat[ing] a strong potential for abuse."' 77 However, Judge Lynch notes
78
that in actuality no "pattern of abuse" regarding RICO had been found.
There have been different reasons for the broadening of RICO, 79 but
definitional problems are among the foremost issues.8 0 For example,
defining what was meant by an associated-in-fact enterprise was left unclear
81
by the statute.

Notre Dame Law School, G. Robert Blakey: Biography, http://law.nd.edu/people/facultyand-administration/teaching-and-research-faculty/ g-robert-blakey (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
For more of his scholarship, see G. Robert Blakey & John Robert Blakey, Civil and Criminal
RICO: An Overview of the Statute and Its Operation, 64 DEF. COuNs. J. 36, 36 (1997)
(explaining that "RICO was drafted to deal with 'enterprise criminality,' that is, 'patterns' of
violence, the provision of illegal goods and services, corruption in the labor or management
relations, corruption in government, and criminal fraud by, through, or against various types
of licit or illicit 'enterprises' (quoting United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th
Cir. 1983))); see also G. Robert Blakey, Foreword,65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 873 (1990); G.
Robert Blakey, Foreword: Debunking RICO's Myriad Myths, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 701
(1990); G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths that Bolster Efforts
to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposalsfor Reform: "Mother of God-Is This the End
of RICO?, " 43 VAND.L. REv. 851 (1990).
Blakey was the attorney listed atop the amicus brief supporting the government in
Boyle v. United States. See Brief of Amicus Curiae for National Ass'n of Shareholder &
Consumer Attorneys (NASCAT) in Support of Respondent, Boyle v. United States, No. 071309 (U.S. Dec. 29, 2008), 2008 WL 5433357 [hereinafter NASCAT Brief for Respondent].
He argued that an association-in-fact enterprise "[d]oes [niot [r]equire [p]leading [o]r [p]roof
[o]f [a]n [a]scertainable [s]tructure." Id. at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). His
argument was based on the reasoning that the statute does not compel a prosecutor or
plaintiff to plead or prove as much, id. at 9, that RICO's legislative history does not suggest
anything to that end, id. at 14, and that Edmund Boyle's arguments were in direct conflict
with the holding of United States v. Turkette, id. at 16.
74. Lynch, supra note 33, at 664.
75. Id. (footnotes omitted).
76. Lynch, supra note 19, at 920. Judge Lynch argues that "under the rubric of RICO,
federal prosecutors were given enormous discretion to prosecute cases that they felt were
inadequately dealt with by existing law, because of jurisdictional or procedural barriers, or
inadequate sanctions. In principle, this grant of discretion is highly objectionable." Id. at
978.
77. Id. at 978-79.
78. Id. at 979.
79. See generally Lynch, supra note 33, at 685-706.
80. See generally id. at 685-94.
81. See infra Parts I.B, II. Both the discussion in Turkette and the fact that Boyle is
currently in front of the U.S. Supreme Court illustrate this proposition.
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B. The EnterpriseRequirement
Having just discussed the history of RICO itself, Part 1.B deals
specifically with one of its most critical elements: the enterprise. Existence
of an enterprise is one of the key inquiries in any RICO action. 82 Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 1962, the investment in,8 3 maintenance of an interest in, 84 or
participation in the affairs of an enterprise 85 are distinct types of unlawful
conduct under RICO, as is the conspiracy to do any of the aforementioned
acts. 86 To state a claim under § 1962(c), for example, a plaintiff or the
government must sufficiently allege "(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3)
through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity. '8 7 This particular part of the
statute provides a good jumping-off point to further explain what an
enterprise can be.
By definition, a RICO enterprise "includes any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity. '88 Our society, in
its development of criminal law, has generally viewed group activity as
more dangerous than individual wrongdoing, and structured, contemplated
activity as more dangerous than ad hoc, haphazard action. 89 Similarly,
because of the supposed danger of organization, the policy behind
punishing RICO enterprises is basic even when a RICO offense is
committed by one person. 90 Our legal system regards the fact that a RICO
violator uses an organization over time to commit many crimes as a more
serious action, and thus something that merits more punishment. 9 1 "The
fact that there is an enterprise already in place that is separate and distinct
from the predicate racketeering acts makes it much simpler to engage in
additional and expanded types of criminal activity." 92 When people are
conducting a pattern of racketeering activity through an enterprise, they are
82. Podgor, supra note 10, at 854.
83. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2006)).
84. Id. at 855 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)).
85. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)).
86. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)).
87. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985) (citing 18 U.S.C. §

1962(c)).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
89. See United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915) ("For two or more to

confederate and combine together to commit or cause to be committed a breach of the
criminal laws is an offense of the gravest character, sometimes quite outweighing, in injury
to the public, the mere commission of the contemplated crime. It involves deliberate plotting
to subvert the laws . . . . [aind it is characterized by secrecy, rendering it difficult of
detection ....); see also Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 448-49 (1949)
(Jackson, J.,concurring) ("[T]he strength, opportunities and resources of many is obviously

more dangerous and more difficult to police than the efforts of a lone wrongdoer." (citing 8
WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 383 (1926); JUSTIN MILLER,

HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 110 (1934))).

90. Susan R. Klein & Katherine P. Chiarello, Successive Prosecutions and Compound
Criminal Statutes: A Functional Test, 77 TEX. L. REV. 333, 343 (1998).
91. Id.

92. Id.(citing United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (7th Cir. 1991)).
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committing this behavior through either a legal entity
with a built-in
93
structure or in a group that has decided to come together.
The term "enterprise" has been called "a nicely vague and encompassing
94
term that could cover just about anything, and was defined so that it did."
Its reach has extended to include police departments, prosecutors' offices,
and even the office of the governor, among many other entities. 9 5 Even an
entire state can serve as a RICO enterprise. 96 For legal entity enterprises,
the structure of the § 1962(c) offense is straightforward: "the prohibited
conduct is the commission of the predicate acts, with the relation of the
97
crimes to an enterprise serving as an aggravating factual circumstance."
The fact that an enterprise exists-and that the given criminal conduct
98
relates to it-is usually easy to determine and thus not contentious.
Not only can a RICO enterprise be a legal entity, but it can also be a
wholly illegal organization.9 9 Establishing the existence of an enterprise is
not as easy in cases involving illegal entities. As Judge Lynch articulates,
"Where the enterprise is an illegitimate association-in-fact, however, the
existence of the enterprise is not merely an easily established formal
element of proof. Rather, the existence of the enterprise is both potentially
controversial and genuinely significant in legally differentiating RICO
offenses from mere aggregations of predicate crimes." 100 In these cases,
the enterprise could be said to represent the heart of the crime. 10 1 If the
statute is read literally, "the RICO statute is violated if 'a group of
individuals associated in fact'-say, the James gang-runs its enterprise not
by criminal means that distort its legitimate ends, but02by the very crimes
that are the object of the association in the first place."'
1. The Turkette Decision
In Turkette, the Supreme Court noted that the definition of § 1961(4), on
its face, appeared "to include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises
within its scope; it no more excludes criminal enterprises than it does
legitimate ones."' 1 3 This use of RICO against illegitimate enterprises
"would become the most important, and the most radical, application of the
criminal provisions of RICO."' 104
93. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
94. Lynch, supra note 33, at 688 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4)).
95. Podgor, supra note 10, at 857-58.
96. See United States v. Warner, Nos. 02 CR 506-1, 02 CR 506-4, 2006 WL 2583722, at
*4 (N.D. I11.Sept. 07, 2006) ("The court reaffirms its previous conclusion that the State of
Illinois may, as a matter of law, serve as a RICO enterprise ... .
97. Lynch, supra note 19, at 942.
98. Id.
99. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-81 (1981).
100. Lynch, supra note 19, at 942-43.
101. Id. at 943.
102. Lynch, supra note 33, at 694.
103. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580-81.

104. Lynch, supra note 33, at 699-700.
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In Turkette, Novia Turkette Jr. and cohorts were charged with, among
other things, conspiracy to conduct and participate in the affairs of an
enterprise engaged in interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering
activities in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). 10 5 Of the nine counts
charged, the "common thread" was Turkette's alleged governance of the
illicit organization through which he conducted and contributed in
perpetrating the various crimes described in the RICO count or charged in
the eight other counts. 10 6 Turkette's indictment described the alleged
enterprise as
a group of individuals associated in fact for the purpose of illegally
trafficking in narcotics and other dangerous drugs, committing arsons,
utilizing the United States mails to defraud insurance companies, bribing
and attempting to bribe local police officers, and corruptly influencing
and attempting
to corruptly influence the outcome of state court
07
proceedings. 1
The evidence at trial concentrated on both the professional nature of the
10 8
organization and the commission of a number of discrete crimes.
Turkette was convicted on all nine counts and was sentenced to a term of
twenty years on the substantive counts, a two-year special parole term on
the drug count, and a twenty-year concurrent term on the RICO conspiracy
count. 109
On appeal, Turkette argued that RICO was solely intended "to protect
legitimate business enterprises from infiltration by racketeers." 10 Turkette
argued that "participation in an association which performs only illegal acts
and which has not infiltrated [or] attempted to infiltrate a legitimate
enterprise" was not made criminal by RICO."'I The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit agreed with this argument, 112 but the Supreme Court
reversed. 13 The Court explained,
RICO is equally applicable to a criminal enterprise that has no legitimate
dimension or has yet to acquire one. Accepting that the primary purpose
of RICO is to cope with the infiltration of legitimate businesses, applying
the statute in accordance with its terms, so as to reach criminal
1
enterprises, would seek to deal with the problem at its very source. 14

105. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 578-79.
106. Id. at 579.
107. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 579-80.
Id. at 580.
United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 899 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 576 ("A

careful reading of sections 1961(4) and 1962(c) convinces us that they cannot be used as
tandem springboards to reach any individual or groups of individuals who engage in a
pattern of exclusively criminal racketeering activity.").
113. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580.
114. Id. at 591.
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The Court thus "explicitly approved the expansion of RICO to
noninfiltrations." 115 The Turkette holding could be defended on policy
grounds, because operating a wholly illicit organization is not something
that society considers "morally neutral," as opposed to running a
corporation. 116 In fact, Judge Lynch notes that the operation of a criminal
organization constitutes "a distinct species of social harm" and is not
"merely an incidental fact about the context" in which a criminal act was
committed. 117
The Court further held that the existence of an "enterprise" may be
proven "by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by
evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit." 118 The
Court explained that a "pattern of racketeering activity" does not constitute
an "enterprise."' 19 The Turkette opinion differentiated an "enterprise,"
which it defined as "an entity[,] ...

a group of persons associated together

for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct," from a "pattern
which it described as "a series of criminal acts as
of racketeering activity,"
120
defined by the statute."
Importantly, the Turkette Court allowed that "the proof used to establish
these separate elements may in particular cases coalesce,"' 2 1 but warned
that "proof of one does not necessarily establish the other."' 122 In other
words, the Court held that it could find both an enterprise and pattern of
racketeering from the same evidence in certain cases.
2. Post-Turkette Disagreement
Despite an extended treatment on RICO enterprises, however, Turkette
did not settle the proof requirement for an associated-in-fact RICO
enterprise. 123 More than a quarter century after Turkette, the law remains
115. D'Angelo, supra note 15, at 2082.
116. Lynch, supra note 19, at 943.
117. Id. RICO, then, is somewhat divergent from a traditional model. As Judge Lynch

writes,
The distinctive nature of criminal punishment, we are told, is that it represents a
societal response to and judgment upon particular moral actions, rather than to a
person's character, status, or intentions. The RICO illicit association cases, in
contrast, demand a more global judgment about a defendant's character and
loyalties. To be found guilty, it is not enough that the defendant has committed

specific criminal acts; those acts must be part of an ongoing commitment to the
values of a criminal organization.
Id. at 945.
118. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.

119. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
120. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2006)).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Compare Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 804-05 (7th Cir.

2008) (holding that an ascertainable structure is required to prove the enterprise element),
with Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 551 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 464 (2007) (holding that no ascertainable structure is required to prove
enterprise). Perhaps the confusion in the circuits is not surprising, as Judge Lynch "contends
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unsettled over the Supreme Court's explanation of the meaning of an
associated-in-fact enterprise. 124 Yet the Court in Turkette claimed there
was "no ambiguity in the RICO provisions at issue." 1 25 The Turkette
requirements "are easily met where the enterprise has a legal existence,
such as a corporation or partnership."' 126 But where the enterprise is
associated in fact, "proof of the various elements becomes more difficult
and proof that demonstrates continuity or organizational structure often
overlaps 127
with the proof relied on to show a pattern of racketeering
activity."'
The circuit courts have conflicting views over whether the same evidence
can be used to prove both an associated-in-fact enterprise and the pattern of
predicate acts, a disagreement explored in Part 11.128 For now, suffice it to
a universal
say that it has been noted that ascertainable structure "is hardly
129
characteristic of associations held to be RICO enterprises."'
Turkette's language has not been generally beneficial in controlling
RICO's reach. 130 The argument that the enterprise element should be
limited in different ways has been a difficult one for courts. 13 1 There are no
exceptions to the statutory definition of enterprise. 132 Additionally, while
that the Court contradicted its own standard established in Turkette. While criminal activity
was [Novia] Turkette's livelihood, his 'enterprise' was loosely comprised of several
individuals with whom he occasionally committed robberies, and a handful of others that he
recruited exclusively for arson jobs." Neil Feldman, Feature, Spiraling Out of Control:
Ramifications of Reading RICO Broadly, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 116, 122 (1998) (citing Lynch,
supra note 33, at 705). Since Turkette's group did not constitute an enterprise under RICO,
Judge Lynch argues, "they should be accountable as individual criminals who engaged in
two or more separate crimes." Id.
124. See Alleged Deal Between Microsoft, Best Buy Is Associated-in-Fact "Enterprise"
UnderRico, 75 U.S.L.W. 1687 (2007) ("The Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have
all said that an associated-in-fact enterprise must have an ascertainable organizational
structure beyond whatever structure is required to engage in the pattern of illegal
racketeering activity. The Seventh Circuit requires that there be some kind of ascertainable
structure, but it does not require that it be a separate structure. The First, Second, Eleventh,
and D.C. Circuits have all said that an ascertainable structure is not required for an
associated-in-fact enterprise.").
125. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587 n.10.
126. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 35.2 (2007) (citing United States v.

Kirk, 844 F.2d 660, 664 (9th Cir. 1988); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1061 n.9 (8th Cir.
1982), aff'd in part,rev'd in part on reh 'g en banc, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1983)).
127. Id.
128. See id. However, it must be noted that the evidence satisfying the requirement of
continuity of the organization may also be used to prove the necessary continuous pattern of
underlying racketeering. Id. at 834-36; see also infra Part II.
129. Lynch, supra note 19, at 974. Judge Lynch, though, argues that the idea that an
enterprise should have both a structure that is ascertainable and "'an existence.., apart from
the commission of the predicate acts' [is] not inconsistent with the existence of enterprises
that pursue entirely illicit goals." Id. (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583). Rather, he sees
Turkette as "largely endors[ing] this requirement" by holding "that the enterprise and pattern
elements of RICO are indeed distinct (though potentially provable by the same evidence)."
Id.
130. Id.
131. See Lynch, supra note 33, at 697.
132. Id. at 698.
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RICO painstakingly spells out the forms that an enterprise might take, as
opposed to "the objects that it might have," the reach of that list, the
generality of the word "enterprise," and a lack of "any restriction whatever
on the substance or purpose of the enterprise, all reinforce the conclusion
that the statute covers the broadest possible range of activity."'1 33
Moreover, while congressional debate prior to RICO's adoption
primarily centered around organized crime's infiltration of "businesses," as
Judge Lynch notes, such debate may indicate that infiltration of other sorts
of enterprises-such as labor unions or even government agencies-was
not beyond the scope of congressional consideration.' 34 RICO's pithy
definition of an enterprise is virtually no help where wholly illegitimate
enterprises are at issue.1 35 Finally, there is "no legislative history regarding
136
illegitimate enterprises."'
3. Attempts to Limit the Enterprise Element
After explaining the enterprise element, Turkette's holding, and the lack
of clarity that flowed from it, it is worth examining attempts to limit the
enterprise element. In 1994, one possible limitation of RICO enterprises
was emphatically rejected. In National Organization for Women v.
Scheidler,137 the Seventh Circuit held that a RICO enterprise must have an
economic goal separate and apart from the predicate acts. 138 However, this
view was rejected by the Supreme Court, which reversed the Seventh
Circuit. 139 Thus, the Court "authorized the expansion of RICO to
140
noneconomic enterprises."
In the original lawsuit, 14 1 women's rights organizations and health
centers brought an action against antiabortion groups, their leaders, and
other people to recover for violations of Sherman Anti-Trust Act and
RICO. 142 The National Organization for Women (NOW) claimed that the
defendants-antiabortion activists, antiabortion groups, and a medical
testing laboratory-took part in a conspiracy to shut down all women's
health centers providing abortions through a pattern of illegality, which
included
extortion; physical and verbal intimidation and threats directed at health
center personnel and patients; trespass upon and damage to center
property; blockades of centers; destruction of center advertising;
telephone campaigns designed to tie up center phone lines; false
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. David Vitter, Comment, The RICO Enterprise as Distinct from the Pattern of
Racketeering Activity: Clarifying the Minority View, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1419, 1448 (1988).
136. Id.
137. 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992).

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 629.
Nat'l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 260-61 (1994).
D'Angelo, supra note 15, at 2085.
Nat'l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937 (N.D. Il. 1991).
Id. at 938.
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appointments to prevent legitimate patients from making them; and direct
with landlords, patients,
interference with centers' business relationships
143
personnel, and medical laboratories.
In reversing, the Supreme Court relied on the plain reading of the text,
explaining, "Nowhere in either § 1962(c) or the RICO definitions in § 1961
is there any indication that an economic motive is required."' 44 Even where
the Court admitted there was an inference that an economic motive was
required for an "enterprise" under § 1962(a) and § 1962(b), the Court said,
"[t]he term 'enterprise' in subsections (a) and (b) plays a different role ....
By contrast, the 'enterprise' in subsection (c) connotes generally the vehicle
through which the unlawful pattern of racketeering activity is committed,
rather than the victim of that activity."'14 5 One commentator notes that any
requirement of an economic goal separate from the commission of the
underlying racketeering activity would in all likelihood have excluded most
146
illicit associations from RICO's reach, which Turkette expressly forbids.
In contrast to its decision in Scheidler, the Supreme Court did limit the
scope of the enterprise element in the previous Term. In 1993, the Supreme
Court narrowed the scope of § 1962(c) liability in Reves v. Ernst &
Young. 147 The Reves Court found that Congress did not intend RICO to
target parties with negligible involvement in racketeering and held that only
those who are in "operation or management" of an enterprise "conduct or
participate... in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs" for the purpose of
§ 1962(c). 14 8 When the Supreme Court announced this "operation or
management" test, "it represented a significant breakthrough."' 49 For the
first time since RICO's adoption twenty-three years earlier, the Court
1 50
instituted a "broad-stroke restriction on the application of' the statute.
Opinion about the Reves holding was divided, as some pundits thought it
meant an end to the liability of nontraditional defendants such as "lawyers,
accountants, and various other professionals sometimes pulled into RICO

143. Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 615.
144. Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 257; see also Adam D. Gale, Note, The Use of Civil RICO
Against Antiabortion Protestorsand the Economic Motive Requirement, 90 COLUM. L. REV.

1341, 1368 (1990) ("Congress removed the term 'business' from 'business enterprise' in
defining enterprise in Senate Bill 1861 and in the final RICO bill." (citing 18 U.S.C. §
1961(4) (2006))).
145. Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 258-59.
146. Lynch, supra note 19, at 974.
147. 507 U.S. 170, 195 (1993).
148. Recent Case, United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v.
Oreto, 37 F.3d 739 (1st Cir. 1994), 108 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1405 (1995) (citing Reves, 507
U.S. 182-86; S. REP. No. 101-269, at 2 (1990)).
149. Sarah Baumgartel, The Crime of Associating with Criminals? An Argument for
Extending the Reves "Operation or Management" Test to RICO Conspiracy, 97 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2 (2006).

150. Id. In 1989, the Supreme Court imposed an interpretive constraint on RICO's
pattern element that a § 1962(c) violation requires that the predicate acts are related and
continuous. See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).
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suits," while others felt that the repercussions would be minimal and were
15 1
limited to the facts of that case.
In Reves, people who purchased demand notes from a farmers'
cooperative filed a class action suit against the cooperative's accountants
for securities fraud. 152 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
held that the accounting company, Arthur Young, was not involved in the
operation or management of the cooperative to the level necessary for any
154
RICO violation. 153 The Supreme Court affirmed.
The Court held that even a person without a formal position in the
enterprise could be liable under RICO, but only if that person played "some
part in directing the enterprise's affairs."' 155 The Court examined the
statutory language of § 1962(c), concluding that the word "conduct"
required "an element of direction," while the word "participate" required
"some part in that direction." 156 Thus, the Court found that "to 'participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs,' one must
have some part in directing those affairs."' 15 7 The Court embraced the
"operation or management" test because it articulated this requirement in an
easy to apply rule. 158 According to the Court, § 1962's legislative history
159
further buttressed the adoption of the "operation or management" test.
The Court concluded that RICO's "liberal construction" clause-stating
that the "provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its
remedial purposes"16 0 -did not foreclose the adoption of the "operation or
management" test. 16 1 While "[t]he clause obviously [sought] to ensure that
Congress' [s] intent [was] not frustrated by an overly narrow reading of the
statute," it was not "an invitation to apply RICO to new purposes that
Congress never intended."' 162 The Court also concluded that Congress did
not intend this statute to reach beyond those who acquired or operated an
enterprise. 163 Finally, the Court found the "operation or management" test

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Baumgartel, supra note 149, at 2.
Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1315-21 (8th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1324.
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 186 (1993).
Id. at 179.

156. Id. at 178-79.
157. Id. at 179 (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c) (2006)).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 183 (quoting Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1970)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also supra note 58 and accompanying text.
161. Id.at 183-84.
162. Id.at 183. The Court further stated, "Nor does the clause help us to determine what
purposes Congress had in mind." Id. at 183-84. But see Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem.
Co., 128 S. Ct. 2131, 2145 (2008) ("Whatever the merits of petitioners' arguments as a
policy matter, we are not at liberty to rewrite RICO to reflect their-or our-views of good
policy.").
163. Reves, 507 U.S. at 182; cf id. at 184 n.8 ("Because the meaning of the statute is
clear from its language and legislative history, we have no occasion to consider the
application of the rule of lenity. We note, however, that the rule of lenity would also favor
the narrower 'operation or management' test that we adopt.").
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was not limited to upper management under § 1962(c) but could also reach
"outsiders" without an official position in an enterprise if these "outsiders"
were associated with the enterprise and participated in its operation or
management. 164
Justice David Souter took issue with the Reves majority's
characterization of RICO as unambiguous. 165 In dissent, Souter stated,
"What strikes the Court as clear, however, looks at the very least hazy to
me, and I accordingly find the statute's 'liberal construction' provision not
irrelevant, but dispositive."' 166 Despite Souter's dissent, Reves, then,

164. Id. at 184-85.
165. Id. at 186 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice David Souter is not the only current
Supreme Court Justice to express concerns over RICO vagueness. Justice Stephen Breyer,
while on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, remarked about the need to limit
"the potentially boundless scope of the word 'enterprise' and "distinguish[] culpable, from
non-culpable, associations." Ryan v. Clemente, 901 F.2d 177, 180 (lst Cir. 1990). Justice
Breyer also recognized "serious consequences for any man or woman, state official or
private person, who is publicly accused of 'racketeering,' even in a private complaint." Id. at
180-81.
Perhaps the strongest RICO criticism came in Justice Antonin Scalia's concurring
opinion in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 251 (1989), which
was joined by former Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, and
Justice Anthony Kennedy. Justice Scalia's frustration centered on the lower courts' varied
interpretations of the "pattern of racketeering activity" element of RICO, which Justice
Scalia called "enigmatic." H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 251 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
According to Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court offered "four clues" on how to interpret the
phrase in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985), a case the court had heard four
years earlier in 1985. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 251. Justice Scalia lamented that instead of
"develop[ing] a meaningful concept of 'pattern'
off of the Sedima holding, courts
"promptly produced the widest and most persistent Circuit split on an issue of federal law in
recent memory." Id. at 251; see also Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Moreover, Justice Scalia was critical of the majority opinion in H.J.Inc., at one point calling
it a "murky discussion." H.J.Inc., 492 U.S. at 254. He wrote,
Today, four years and countless millions in damages and attorney's fees later (not
to mention prison sentences under the criminal provisions of RICO), the Court
does little more than repromulgate those hints as to what RICO means, though
with the caveat that Congress intended that they be applied using a "flexible
approach."
...I doubt that the lower courts will find the Court's instructions much more
helpful than telling them to look for a "pattern"-which is what the statute already
says.
Id. at 251-52.
Scalia implied that defining or illuminating the exact requirement for a "pattern of
racketeering activity" was not only beyond him, but also beyond the Supreme Court,
implying that Congress should step in and amend the statute. Id. at 255. He wrote that the
majority opinion increased RICO's vagueness instead of removing it, adding nothing to the
prior guidance in Sedima, which itself "created a kaleidoscope of Circuit positions." Id.
"That situation is bad enough with respect to any statute, but it is intolerable with respect to
RICO." Id.
Scalia ended his scathing critique of both the opaque RICO and the Court's efforts to
clarify it by noting, "That the highest Court in the land has been unable to derive from this
statute anything more than today's meager guidance bodes ill for the day when [a Due
Process] challenge is presented." Id. at 256.
166. Reves, 507 U.S. at 187 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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represented7 a powerful opinion in the battle to narrow RICO's scope, if a
16
rare one.

The defendants in Scheidler and Reves might not be considered the face
of "organized crime" by the reasonable person, yet defendants who are
organized crime members trying to infiltrate legitimate enterprises areaccording to one study-the rarest of RICO defendants. 168 Given this
failure of RICO to accomplish virtually anything toward its original goal of
directly penalizing organized crime infiltration of legitimate business,
reform has been advocated. 169 Judge Lynch argues that it is this
167. Alexander M. Parker, Note, Stretching RICO to the Limit and Beyond, 45 DUKE L.J.
819, 838 (1996) ("[A]s with the pattern requirement, the judiciary has interpreted the
enterprise language of RICO in its absolute broadest manner. Indeed, the most restrictive
element of the enterprise requirement is the separation of enterprise from pattern. This
serves to differentiate RICO from ordinary conspiracy, but in this form it does nothing to
minimize the statute's recognized overbreadth as the drafters seem to have believed it
would."). This broad interpretation extending RICO enterprises ultimately leads to far-flung
applications: "RICO has expanded beyond career criminals who insidiously buy up
legitimate companies to launder their ill-gotten gains to political activists who proclaim their
message in the public square. To suggest that the same statute[] should be used to control
activities on both ends of the spectrum is absurd." Id. at 848.
168. Lynch, supra note 33, at 726-27. In a survey of all reported criminal RICO cases
decided in the courts of appeals from 1970-1985, only 17 of 236 RICO indictments (fewer
than 8%) included in the study appear to have included counts charging violations of the
sections of RICO that directly prohibit infiltration of legitimate enterprises by criminal
elements, or conspiracies to violate them. Id. at 726. "RICO has been a nearly total failure
as a weapon against the kind of activity that led Congress to enact it. The sections of RICO
that directly prohibit infiltration of legitimate enterprises by criminal elements have been all
but dead letters as prosecuting tools." Id. The study, though, did find that "over forty
percent-the largest single category-of the 228 indictments containing counts charging
violations of section 1962(c) that have generated appellate opinions have involved the
operation of wholly criminal enterprises." Id. at 733. "Given the emphasis in the legislative
history on infiltration of legitimate enterprises, and the early split in the courts of appeals
concerning whether an 'enterprise' that had no purpose independent of the commission of
the predicate acts of racketeering even could constitute a RICO enterprise," that finding was
"impressive." Id.; see also id. at 735 tbl. 1.
169. Id. at 763-64. Even when accepting the argument that RICO prosecutions of wholly
illegal enterprises are effective and morally acceptable ways of combating organized crime,
it does not "necessarily follow that RICO as currently written is the best, or even an
acceptable, statutory device for allowing such prosecutions." Lynch, supra note 19, at 972.
Judge Lynch argues that "it is likely that the same effects can be achieved by a statute that is
more carefully drafted to attack the specific evil presented, without the all-encompassing
scope of the present RICO statute." Id. Another commentator believes that had Turkette
come out the other way, Congress almost certainly would have stepped in to rewrite RICO.
Stephen F. Smith, Proportionalityand Federalization,91 VA. L. REV. 879, 915 (2005). As
Stephen Smith argues,
The Court in Turkette could have sent the matter back to Congress by adhering
to the originally intended infiltration approach. Had it done so, the Department of
Justice would have certainly alerted Congress to the disadvantages of the
infiltration approach. To the extent that the Court's opinion clearly articulated the
danger that a RICO stripped of infiltration activity could be used simply as a
penalty-enhancer for conspiratorial behavior far removed from organized crime,
Congress would have been on notice of this serious problem. Not only would
Congress's deliberations have been better informed as a result of a reasoned
judicial refusal to reconceptualize RICO, but the chances for an effective
legislative solution to the overbreadth problem would also have been maximized.
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overreaching breadth of the definition of "enterprise" that is the main
impediment to narrowing the scope of RICO to a prohibition of wholly
illegal organizations. 170 And it has been strongly advocated by more than
one commentator that there is a "danger presented by a statute that vests so
much additional power (whether or not exercised responsibly) in
prosecutors and sentencing judges to escalate the potential or actual
sanctions for criminal conduct[, which] puts too much strain on
17 1
fundamental principles of legality."'
C. Vagueness Problems and ProsecutorialDiscretion
As explained in Part I.B, some courts and commentators believe the
traditional RICO enterprise definition allows for too broad of a reach.
Instead, the Court took the initiative of reconceptualizing RICO on its own and
assumed the difficult task of creating limitations on the concepts of "enterprise"
and "pattern" to do the work that the requirement of infiltration activity was
designed to do. In doing so, the Court eliminated any realistic chance that
Congress would limit RICO on its own.
This outcome was particularly unfortunate. Though the Supreme Court has
struggled, without much success, to limit RICO to acceptable bounds ever since
Turkette, it would have been easy for a Congress apprised of the danger of
disproportionate punishment to have done so by legislation. Now, by virtue of the
approach the Court took in Turkette, there is little chance that Congress will ever
address this important problem.
Id. at 917-18.
170. Lynch, supra note 19, at 973 ("The residual definition of enterprise as 'any...
group of individuals associated in fact,' is excessively broad and amorphous to serve as the
distinguishing feature of a new form of criminality-which is essentially the role played by
the enterprise concept in the illicit association cases."). Judge Lynch later concludes, "Some
requirement of structure, then, should be an essential part of the definition of enterprise
under RICO ....
" Id. at 974-75.
171. Lynch, supra note 33, at 763 (arguing for targeted congressional reform of the
statute); see also Lynch, supra note 19, at 981-82 ("[T]he problem of definition remains.
While I am not certain that a statute can be drafted that criminalizes membership in a
criminal organization without the overbreadth and imprecision characterizing RICO, it
seems worthwhile to make the attempt .... Realistically, however, it is probably too much to
hope for serious discussion in Congress about such a radical overhaul of RICO .... The
present political and social climate seems particularly ill-suited to the consideration of penal
legislation that cannot be portrayed as increasing the 'toughness' of criminal laws....
Pending another effort to recodify the federal penal code completely, I fear my suggestions
for change in federal RICO are, for want of a better word, academic."); cf Samuel W. Buell,
The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1491, 1534 (2008) ("By and large, the
Department of Justice has kept a tight rein on use of the statute so as to prevent such
prosecutions from spurring Congress to revoke powers that the law gives prosecutors. Still,
some prosecutions raise questions about whether RICO's breadth sweeps in cases that do not
involve the kinds of threats to sanctioning regimes that justify the statute's existence. There
is considerable distance between the sophisticated organized offender for whom the
traditional tools of criminal law may be inadequate and the high-profile or otherwise
tempting target who happens to commit two or more crimes."); Smith, supra note 169, at
915 ("Although faith in prosecutorial discretion has arguably been vindicated by extreme
restraint in the use of criminal RICO, the course of action pursued in Turkette was, to say the
least, dangerous. It created a serious risk of disproportionately severe punishment for
ordinary conspiracies bearing little, if any, resemblance to organized crime. Though the risk
did not fully materialize, there was no sound reason to take it in the first place.").
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Thus, this section deals with two potential repercussions that follow from
(1) such overbreadth may make the statute
such an interpretation:
unconstitutionally vague; and (2) in criminal cases, prosecutorial discretion
is critical to prevent the trampling of the spirit, if not the letter, of the law.
The Supreme Court has held that an enactment is void for vagueness
under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments "if
its prohibitions are not clearly defined."' 172 No vagueness challenge
concerning RICO has ever reached the Supreme Court, but "a few Justices
have hinted at its constitutional vagueness."' 173 At least one commentator
pointedly argues that RICO's language goes well beyond being too broad
1 74
and might actually be unconstitutionally vague in some applications.
"Reasonable people, including experienced Supreme Court and Federal
Justices, cannot ascertain its meaning. In addition, courts have widely
differed as to its application. Even Professor [G. Robert] Blakey, the father
of RICO, has admitted vagueness concerns. RICO is as vague as vague can
be."' 175 Another critic attacks the enterprise element as being defined so
that it could encompass "everything or nothing,"' 176 and wonders, "Is it not
of a
obvious that a 'virtually limitless definition' of an essential element
' 77
one?"'
vague
unconstitutionally
an
definition,
by
is,
statute
criminal
172. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). In Grayned, the Court
wrote,
It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if
its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important
values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and
unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.
Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide
explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates
basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc
and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application. Third, but related, where a vague statute abut[s] upon sensitive areas
of basic First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the exercise of [those]
freedoms. Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to steer far wider of the
unlawful zone . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly
marked.
Id. at 108-09 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
173. Carolyn J. Lockwood, Comment, Regulating The Abortion Clinic Battleground:
Will Free Speech Be the Ultimate Casualty?, 21 OHfo N.U. L. REv. 995, 1051 (1995); see
also supra note 165 and accompanying text. Consider the argument that four of the Justices
from the H.J. Inc. concurrence had more than "hinted" at RICO's unconstitutionality and
actually "invited such a challenge [and] strongly suggested that they would support it."
Rakoff, supra note 72. Judge Rakoff notes that the Court rejected a vagueness challenge to
Indiana's "little RICO" statute in Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U'S. 46 (1989), but
points out that the issue of the potential vagueness of any equivalent to the "pattern" and
"enterprise" elements of RICO was not before the Court, and that Justices Kennedy, William
Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall all dissented on the ground that the Indiana statute was
unconstitutionally vague. Id.
174. Lockwood, supra note 173, at 1051.
175. Id.
176. Rakoff, supra note 72.
177 Id
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However, the argument that RICO is unconstitutionally vague has been
summarily dismissed by courts because RICO is far different from the
"imprecise loitering statutes that have been found unconstitutionally vague
by various courts." 1 78 Even so, the question remains whether citizens can
properly conduct their affairs vis-A-vis a system where prohibitions are
painstakingly laid out but where unanticipated harsh penalties can be
assessed. 179 Without clearly knowing the penalties that attach to a given
offense, a person planning his activities does not have "full notice of what
behavior society truly expects" from him-and what conduct it expects him
180
to avoid.
Moreover, the principle of legality "also demands that officials be given
reasonably clear instructions concerning how violators should be
treated." 18 1 As one commentator points out, "the more important aspect of
the vagueness doctrine, according to the Supreme Court, is not actual
notice, but . . . the requirement that a legislature establish minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement." 182 This aspect has been considered
of primary importance because "[w]here the legislature fails to provide such
minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit a standardless sweep
[that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal
183
predilections."
Whether or not RICO is unconstitutionally vague, the wide berth
accorded to RICO's statutory language in both civil actions and criminal
penalties leads to comparatively harsh consequences for wrongdoers-a
twenty-year prison term, and forfeiture of a business owner's business, for
example, for one violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962.184 Consider, also, the
conclusion that "[c]ivil RICO's treble damages were meant not to reform or
regulate racketeers but to ruin them." 185
On the criminal side of RICO, the potentially thorny issue of federal-state
balance arises. Federalism concerns are particularly pronounced under
RICO because the nature of federal law enforcement effectively gives
individual prosecutors the ability to determine whether ordinarily state
86
crimes will be federalized. 1
178. Lynch, supra note 33, at 717 ("RICO does not require citizens to guess at their peril
what kinds of conduct they must avoid to conduct their affairs in accordance with law.").
179. Id.
180. Id. at 717-18.
181. Id. at718.
182. Rakoff, supra note 72 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
183. Id. (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358) (internal quotation marks omitted).
184. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2006).
185. Jonathan Turley, Laying Hands on Religious Racketeers: Applying Civil RICO to
FraudulentReligious Solicitation, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 441, 481 (1988).

186. Brief for Center on the Administration of Criminal Law as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 24, Boyle v. United States, No. 07-1309 (U.S. Nov. 28, 2008), 2008
WL 5079032 ("Expanding the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction necessarily expands the
scope of prosecutorial discretion and therefore pushes decision-making about the 'sensitive'
'federal-state balance' in criminal enforcement farther from politically accountable actors.
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Acknowledging this reality, the U.S. Attorney's Office decided long ago

to implement guidelines for limiting criminal prosecutions utilizing
RICO.1 87 Balancing what it calls "society's interest in effective law
enforcement against the consequences for the accused," the United States
Attorneys'Manual states that utilization of RICO, "more so than most other
federal criminal sanctions, requires particularly careful and reasoned
application."' 18 8 While acknowledging the broad statutory language of
RICO and the legislative intent that the statute "shall be liberally construed
to effectuate its remedial purpose,"' 189 the U.S. Attorney's Office
nevertheless decided that "it is the policy of the Criminal Division that
RICO be selectively and uniformly used."' 190
Spelling out its mandate for narrow RICO prosecutions, the UnitedStates
Attorneys' Manual stressed that "not every proposed RICO charge that
meets the technical requirements of a RICO violation will be approved.
Further, the Criminal Division will not approve 'imaginative' prosecutions
under RICO which are far afield from the congressional purpose of the
RICO statute."' 19 1 And when RICO is sought merely to serve some
evidentiary purpose, approval from the Criminal Division will be granted
"[o]nly in exceptional circumstances." 192
Thus, the United States

Individual federal prosecutors have wide, almost unchecked discretion to make RICO
charging decisions.").
187. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-110.200 (1984)

[hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/
foia_reading-roomusam/title9/1 1Omcrm.htm#9-110.200.
188. Id.
189. Id.; see also Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1970).
190. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 187, § 9-110.200. In a 5-4 dissenting
opinion in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Justice Marshall noted that the only restraining
influence on "the inexorable expansion of the mail and wire fraud statutes [in RICO] has
been the prudent use of prosecutorial discretion." 473 U.S. 479, 502 (1985) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Marshall noted that there is no such
official discretion with respect to civil RICO suits, as, of course, "the restraining influence of
prosecutors is completely absent." Id. at 504.
191. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 187, § 9-110.200.
192. Id. For an apparent example of these exceptional circumstances-where the former
mayor of Providence, R.I., was convicted under RICO-see Mike Stanton, Cianci Fails in
Final Bid to Overturn His Conviction, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 12, 2005, available at
http://www.projo.com/news/content/projo-20051012_cianci 12.131 d53aa.html.
The thoughts of U.S. Attorney Robert Clark Corrente about that case are particularly
noteworthy:
It's important for the public psyche to continue to be aggressive in pursuing
these kinds of cases .... The hidden cost of this type of corruption is the lack of
confidence in our elected officials, and the cloud of suspicion that is unfair to 99
percent of them. Then there's the whole cost in terms of businesses that won't
locate here because of the perception of corruption, real or imagined.
It's fallen to this office over the years to prosecute public corruption .... You'd
like to think that after a while you wouldn't need to, that the message would have
gotten out there. But to the extent that the message was not out there, the Cianci
case shows that we will track down this sort of stuff, even if it takes five years to
prosecute and three years for the appeals process.
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Attorneys' Manual presented a view that the congressional purpose was not
nearly as broad as some of RICO's foremost champions have believed.
Still, some are concerned that the power in the prosecutors' hands is
directly proportional to the vagueness of RICO language-particularly with
the enterprise element) 9 3 Where the enterprise element completely
collapses into the pattern of racketeering, the repercussions are that "a
prosecutor's decision to charge two loosely related individuals under RICO
based solely on predicate acts criminalized by state law is judicially
unreviewable. The decision to alter the lines between federal and state
criminal enforcement should not be made by federal prosecutors on a caseby-case basis." 194 Perhaps given the unique history of RICO, the
disagreement over who it was intended to ensnare, and the particular
misgivings of its harshest critics, it is no wonder a circuit split has
developed regarding the enterprise element.
II. THE BATTLE OVER THE "ASSOCIATED-IN-FACT" ENTERPRISE
REQUIREMENT

Having discussed the history of RICO and RICO enterprises in Part I,
Part II of this Note now dissects and analyzes the three-way circuit split
over the RICO associated-in-fact enterprise requirement. Part II.A details
the arguments supporting a broad reading of the RICO statute, which at
least four circuits argue does not require proof of an ascertainable structure.
Part II.B details the arguments supporting a narrow reading of the statute,
which does require an ascertainable structure separate and distinct from the
pattern of racketeering activity. Part II.C details the Seventh Circuit's
middle-ground approach, which requires an ascertainable structure as proof
for the enterprise element, but does not require the enterprise to have goals
or purposes separate and distinct from the pattern of racketeering activity.
The facts and positions of Boyle are detailed in Part II.D. The Supreme
Court has finally decided to resolve this circuit split, recently granting
certiorari in Boyle. 19 5 The question presented is whether an associated-infact enterprise needs an ascertainable structure apart from the pattern of
racketeering it engages in. This highly anticipated decision has broad
implications on future prosecutions and civil liability under RICO. 196 A
case like Edmund Boyle's provides a clear example of the implications: the
narrowest reading of the enterprise element would raise the proof threshold
to only those associations with a distinct ascertainable structure, while the
broadest reading opens the door for RICO prosecutions of groups with a
less rigid connection.
193. Brief for Center on the Administration of Criminal Law as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 186, at 23-25.
194. Id. at 25.
195. United States v. Boyle, 283 F. App'x 825 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 29
(2008).
196. See The Boyle Case & RICO Enterprises, supra note 18 ("[Boyle] will hopefully

resolve one of the nagging issues that pervades this area of the law.").
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A. No Ascertainable Structure (the Minority View)
Heeding Congress's direction that RICO "shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes,"' 197 a minority of circuits have adopted a

proof requirement that an "associated-in-fact" enterprise needs no
ascertainable structure that is separate and distinct from the pattern of
racketeering. Recall that in Turkette, the Supreme Court held that an
enterprise is "an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in
which it engages."' 198 The Court further held that an associated-in-fact
enterprise could be a wholly illegitimate organization. 199 The key
definition that has flummoxed the circuit courts is Turkette's holding that
the enterprise is "proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or
informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a
'20
continuing unit."'200 The enterprise must have a "common purpose." '
Whether this was the totality of the proof needed-or whether implicit
within that statement was evidence of an ascertainable structure-has been
the subject of an intractable circuit split for more than a quarter of a
century.
As the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, noted in Odom, "[t]he [Supreme]
Court's explanation of the meaning of an associated-in-fact enterprise in
Turkette has not been clearly understood in the lower courts, including our
own." 20 2 It surveyed the other circuits, as well as its own, before
20 3
concluding that no ascertainable structure is needed.
The requirement of an ascertainable structure that is separate from the
pattern of racketeering activity has been attacked as intellectually
dishonest 20 4 and an "arbitrary tool. ' 205 Moreover, it has been attacked by
20 6
lower courts as contrary to the holding of Turkette.
1. First Circuit
In United States v. Patrick,20 7 the First Circuit held that because
Congress intended the term "enterprise" to include both legal and criminal
197. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1970).
198. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
199. Id. at 591.
200. Id. at 583.
201. Id.
202. Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 549 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 464 (2007).
203. Id. at 550-51.
204. Jeffrey E. Grell, Odom v. Microsoft Corp.: The Ninth Circuit Abandons the
Enterprise/Racketeering Activity

Distinction,

RIcOACT.coM,

Aug.

2007,

at

5,

http://www.ricoact.com/pdf/ODOM.pdf. Jeffrey Grell is a 1990 magna cum laude graduate
of Georgetown University Law Center and a former adjunct professor at the University of
Minnesota. See RICOAct.com, Biography:
Jeffrey Ernest Grell, Biography,
http://www.ricoact.com/ about/bio.asp (last visited Feb. 289, 2009).
205. Grell, supra note 204, at 2.
206. Odom, 486 F.3d at 551.
207. 248 F.3d I1 (1st Cir. 2001).
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enterprises, and because "the latter may not observe the niceties of
legitimate organizational structures," it could not "import an 'ascertainable
'20 8
structure' requirement into jury instructions.
2. Eleventh Circuit
In United States v. Cagnina,209 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court decided in Turkette that the
organization of an associated-in-fact enterprise may be formal or informal,
and thus there
was no suggestion that it must have "a distinct, formalized
2 10
structure."
3. Second Circuit
In perhaps the strongest rejection of a separate and distinct ascertainable2 11
structure requirement, the Second Circuit in United States v. Bagaric
determined that "it is logical to characterize any associative group in terms
of what it does, rather than by abstract analysis of its structure. '2 12 The
court recognized that the pattern of a group's misconduct often provides the
best evidence toward defining the enterprise. 2 13 "We have upheld
application of RICO to situations where the enterprise
was, in effect, no
'2 14
more than the sum of the predicate racketeering acts."
4. Ninth Circuit
In Odom, the Ninth Circuit abandoned its ascertainable-structure
requirement based on the language of Turkette, saying that to hold
otherwise "would be to require precisely what the Court in Turkette held
that RICO does not require. Such a requirement would necessitate that the
enterprise have a structure to serve both illegal racketeering activities as
2 15
well as legitimate activities."
In Odom, the plaintiff, James Odom, filed a putative class action suit
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and (d) that was dismissed for failure to state a
208. Id. at 19.
209. 697 F.2d 915 (11 th Cir. 1983).
210. Id. at 921.
211, 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983), abrogatedon other grounds by Nat'l Org. for Women v.
Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 259-60 (1994).
212. Id. at 56.
213. Id. at 55.
214. Id. (citing United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85, 88-89 (2d Cir. 1983); United States
v. Errico, 635 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d
Cir. 1976) (per curiam)); see also United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 853 (2d Cir.
1985) ("RICO charges may be proven even when the enterprise and predicate acts are
'functionally equivalent ....' (quoting Bagaric, 706 F.2d at 57)). But see United States v.
Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 203 (2d Cir. 2008) (pointing out that the charged enterprise, the MS-13
national gang, had "leadership structure" that was "separate from the series of criminal
acts").
215. Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 551 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 464 (2007).
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claim. 2 16 The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington
held that Odom failed to allege an "associated-in-fact" enterprise, which at
2 17
the time in the Ninth Circuit required an ascertainable structure.
Odom alleged that the defendants entered into an agreement in April
2000, when "Microsoft invested $200 million in Best Buy and agreed to
promote Best Buy's online store" through its MSN Internet access
service. 2 18 For its part, "Best Buy agreed to promote MSN service and
other Microsoft products in its stores and advertising." 2 19 Odom claimed
that pursuant to this agreement, Best Buy employees distributed different
Microsoft "Trial CDs," and a customer who purchased a computer would
receive a Trial CD providing a free six-month subscription to MSN. 220 He
asserted that if the customer was paying by debit or credit card, the Best
Buy employee would scan the Trial CD and would claim it was for
"inventory control or otherwise misrepresent[] the purpose of the scanning"
if asked why.2 2 1 Odom alleged that this scanning sent information to
Microsoft, who would then open an MSN account in the customer's name
unbeknownst to the customer. 222 If the free trial period ended before the
customer cancelled the account, Microsoft would start charging the debit or
credit card number. 223 According to Odom, these companies were involved
224
in an associated-in-fact enterprise because of this scheme.
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed and remanded. 225 Noting
that the Supreme Court held in Turkette that a purely criminal enterprise
could be an associated-in-fact enterprise within the meaning of RICO, the
Ninth Circuit rejected 226
any further requirement that there be an
"ascertainable structure."
Instead, Odom tracked the language of
Turkette and held that a plaintiff, or, if a criminal proceeding, the
government, need only meet the three-part test of proving that the
associated-in-fact enterprise was (1) associated together for a "common
purpose" of engaging in a course of conduct; 227 (2) an "ongoing
organization, either formal or informal"; 228 and (3) comprised of various
associates functioning "as a continuing unit."' 229 At the beginning of its
analysis, the majority noted, "We take from these cases the general
instruction that we should not read the statutory terms of RICO
216. See Odom v. Microsoft Corp., No. C03-2976P, 2004 WL 5407314, at *2-6 (W.D.
Wash. Mar. 16, 2004).

217. Id. at *4.
218. Odom, 486 F.3d at 543 (internal quotation marks omitted).
219. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
220. Id.

221. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
222. Id.

223. Id.
224. Id. at 544.
225. Id. at 555.
226. Id. at 551-52.
227. Id. at 552 (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981)).
228. Id. (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583) (internal quotation marks omitted).

229. Id. (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583).
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The majority cited Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., which

stated that "RICO is to be read broadly." 23 1 "As Congress admonished and
RICO should 'be liberally construed to
as the Court repeated in Sedima,232
effectuate its remedial purposes."'
Two concurrences were written. 233 Judge Barry Silverman, joined by
four other judges, concurred only in the result, construing the complaint to
allege nothing more than a contract and its performance: 234 "[T]he
Complaint assumes that if two parties perform a series of 'predicate acts'
for each other's benefit pursuant to a commercial agreement, they ipsofacto
RICO targets a more
I cannot agree.
constitute an 'enterprise.'
sophisticated crowd . . . [as distinguished from] a run-of-the-mill
conspiracy." 2 35 Judge Silverman argued that the majority's interpretation
"would make a RICO enterprise out of any commercial agreement between
two companies that involved performing two or more RICO predicate
acts." 236 Judge Jay Bybee, joined by Judge Stephen Reinhardt, wrote a
one-paragraph concurrence that argued that it was "outlandish" that a
marketing contract could subject the two businesses to a private RICO

230. Id. at 547.
231. Id. (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985)).
232. Id. (quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498). One commentator described Odom v.
Microsoft Corp. as "well-reasoned," concluding that Odom requirements are sufficient to
prevent plaintiffs from engaging in "circular reasoning" that an associated-in-fact enterprise
exists wherever and whenever people engage in racketeering. See Grell, supra note 204, at 6.
Under the Turkette criteria, proving a common purpose will not automatically prove an
ongoing organizational structure or the functioning of a continuing unit. Id. That
commentator notes, "[T]he enterprise/racketeering activity distinction [is] an arbitrary tool
used by the courts to dismiss RICO claims that comply with the technicalities of the RICO
Act but do not describe 'racketeering' in the traditional, Mafia-based scenario." Id. at 2.
Another commentator, applauding the Odom decision, agreed with the majority
opinion in Sedima that RICO should be revised, if at all, by Congress. See Recent Case,
Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
464 (2007), 121 HARV. L. REv. 1652, 1659 (2008) [hereinafter Recent Case, Odom]. Sedima
dealt with the pattern of racketeering element of RICO. Over a vigorous twenty-four-page
dissent by Justice Marshall, the majority allowed the broader interpretation and asserted that
the fact that RICO is being applied in situations not contemplated by Congress represents
breadth, not ambiguity. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499. This commentator, however, opines that
there was no need to drudge up congressional purpose to interpret RICO, since the statute's
broad language was enough to do the heavy lifting in this case. Recent Case, Odom, supra, at
1655-56. The commentator warned that "Supreme Court RICO precedent indicates that this
rule of broad construction is unnecessary where the statute is relatively clear. Moreover,
where RICO is unclear, the Court has sometimes adopted the narrower available
construction based on the background common law." Id. at 1656. Limitations on RICO
outside the actual text of the statute have been applied by the Court, although that course of
action was rejected in Turkette. Id. at 1658; see, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170,
195 (1993); see also supra notes 147-67 and accompanying text.
233. Odom, 486 F.3d at 555 (Silverman, J.,concurring in the judgment); id. at 556
(Bybee, J., concurring).
234. Id. at 556 (Silverman, J., concurring in the judgment).
235. Id. at 555.
236. See Recent Case, Odom, supra note 232, at 1655.
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action, but added that the Supreme Court long ago dismissed his
237
concerns.
B. Separateand Distinct AscertainableStructure (the Majority View)
The majority of the circuits have adopted a proof requirement that the
ascertainable structure in an "associated-in-fact" enterprise must be separate
and distinct from the pattern of racketeering to guard against the dangers of
an overly broad interpretation.2 38 Where a RICO offense is committed,
even by one person, the fact that the person is using an organization over
time to commit multiple crimes makes the person worthy of additional
punishment: 239 the enterprise, distinct from the actual predicate acts,
facilitates expanded types of criminal activity. 24 0 The difference between a
drug kingpin and a garden-variety drug dealer has been cited to illustrate
this proposition. 24 1 What distinguishes the kingpin "is her use of an
existing enterprise to enable her to commit many more drug predicates and
to allow her to reach additional geographical areas and types of controlled
substances." 242 This unique vehicle is considered more injurious to society
and more reprehensible than a simple conspiracy plus the commission of
predicate crimes, so this operation of an enterprise warrants a harsher
243
punishment.
If "enterprise" is broadly defined, then virtually any dishonest
participation in such an "enterprise" would be a RICO violation. 244 One
237. Odom, 486 F.3d at 556 (Bybee, J., concurring).
238. See Brief for the Petitioner at 6, Boyle v. United States, No. 07-1309 (U.S. Nov. 21,
2008), 2008 WL 5026647 (collecting cases in the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth and Tenth Circuits). Both parties seem to argue that the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit conforms to their view. Compare Brief for the United States
in Opposition, supra note 3, at 7-8 (citing United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 364 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (approving jury instruction and stating "[i]t is not necessary that the enterprise, if
it existed, have any particular or formal structure" (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted))), with Brief for the Petitioner, supra, at 7 (quoting United States v.
Richardson, 167 F.3d 621, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that "some structure" is necessary to
differentiate enterprise from "mere conspiracy" (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted))). Additionally, an amicus curiae brief for respondent opined that the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is in the middle position of this three-way circuit split along
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which requires an ascertainable
structure that need not be separate from the pattern of racketeering activity. See NASCAT
Brief for Respondent, supra note 73, at 21 n. 15 (citing United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401,
425 (6th Cir. 2000)); see also infra note 278.
239. Klein & Chiarello, supra note 90, at 343.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 343-44.
243. Id. at 344.
244. Steven B. Duke, Commentary, Legality in the Second Circuit, 49 BROOK. L. REv.
911, 923-24 (1983) (expressing concern about United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23 (2d
Cir. 1981) and its progeny). The court held in Angelilli that the New York City Civil Court
(or similar governmental units) could be enterprises within the meaning of RICO. Angelilli,
660 F.2d at 30-31. The court added, "On its face, the definition of 'enterprise' is quite
broad." Id. at 31; see also Smith, supra note 169, at 912 ("The effect of Turkette is that
crooks who get together to commit two or more crimes can potentially be convicted under
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commentator fretted that if lawyers for parties in litigation wrote two
dishonest briefs-or a court wrote two dishonest opinions-within a ten245
year span, RICO was arguably violated.
1. Eighth Circuit
In Asa-Brandt, Inc. v. ADM Investor Services., Inc.,246 the Eighth Circuit
reaffirmed its longtime position that proof of an enterprise required a
showing that "the enterprise must have a common or shared purpose, some
continuity of personnel, and an ascertainable structure distinct" from the
predicate crimes. 24 7 The Eighth Circuit has required this showing for over
twenty years, beginning with United States v. Bledsoe248 the year after
Turkette was decided.
Bledsoe was a criminal case concerning securities fraud wherein twentytwo individuals were originally indicted under RICO. 249 The Eighth Circuit
rejected the government's contention that "any association of individuals
can be an enterprise" 250 because, under this argument, "any confederation,
no matter how loose or temporary, of two or more individuals committing
two or more sporadic crimes which are predicate crimes under RICO
provides a basis for prosecution under the Act."'25 1 Disagreeing with other
courts that accepted a loose construction of RICO, the Bledsoe court looked
to RICO's history, the statute's language, and the surrounding context to
252
determine that a broad construction was unwarranted.
The Bledsoe court found that although the main reason for enacting 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c) "was to prevent organized crime from infiltrating
businesses and other legitimate economic entities," Congress did not draft
the statute simply to apply it that way. 253 Citing Turkette, the Bledsoe court
wrote that RICO was not intended to reach any and all criminals who
merely associate together and perpetrate two of the specified crimes, but
rather was aimed at "organized crime." 25 4 Establishing that, the Bledsoe
court recognized that RICO "was not intended to require direct proof that
RICO. That result, though just applied to highly structured entities like organized crime,
creates the danger that garden-variety conspiracies (such as a stick-up man and getaway-car
driver who rob a couple of banks) can be prosecuted as RICO violations.").
245. Duke, supranote 244, at 924.
246. 344 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2003).
247. Id. at 752 (citing Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1351 (8th Cir. 1997)).
248. 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1982).
249. See id. at 651.
250. Id. at 661-62.
251. Id. at 662. For proof of this proposition in action, the court in United States v.
Bledsoe cited United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), a case where two
defendants were convicted under RICO after the commission of three home burglaries, id.
252. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d at 662. "[RICO] was not intended to be a catchall reaching all
concerted action of two or more criminals involving two or more of the designated crimes."
Id. at 659.
253. Id. at 662.
254. Id. (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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individuals are engaged in something as ill defined as 'organized
crime.' ... The statute is an attack on organized crime, but it utilizes a per
se approach. ' 25 5 Analyzing the word "enterprise," the majority noted that it
normally stands for "an undertaking or project or a unit of organization
established" for those purposes. 256 In the case of RICO, though, the court
found that "an enterprise cannot simply be the undertaking of the acts of
racketeering, neither can it be the minimal association which surrounds
these acts." 257 Any two crimes will always be accomplished through some
type of coordination, and every time people jointly break the law, there is
always some degree of relationship beyond the commission of the crime
itself, the Bledsoe court noted. 258 For this reason, "unless the inclusion of
the enterprise element requires proof of some structure separate from the
racketeering activity and distinct from the organization which is a necessary
incident to the racketeering, the Act simply punishes the commission of two
period. ' 259 That was not
of the specified crimes within a 10-year
260
Congress's intent, the court concluded.
To ward off this "danger of guilt by association" 26 1 and to make sure that
enterprise did not require merely a conspiracy, the Eighth Circuit required
an "ascertainable structure" distinct from that inherent in a pattern of
racketeering activity. 262 This could be demonstrated by proof that a group
has an organizational pattern or system of authority beyond what was
necessary to perpetrate the predicate crimes or that it engaged in a diverse
pattern of crimes. 263 A distinct ascertainable structure, according to the
264
Bledsoe court, could be found in a Mafia family or a prostitution ring.
The majority found that no enterprise was proven. 265 However, Judge
Donald Ross' dissent-based mainly on the Turkette language and with
Congress's direction to construe RICO liberally to effectuate its remedial
266
purposes-concluded that there existed an enterprise.
2. Third Circuit
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined two years
after Turkette that an ascertainable structure separate from the pattern of
racketeering was required to prove an "associated-in-fact" enterprise in its

255.
United
256.
257.

Id. at 663 (citing United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363-64 (9th Cir. 1975);
States v. Chovanec, 467 F. Supp. 41, 44-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)).
Id.at 664.
Id.

258. Id.

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 665.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 667.
Id.at 671-72 (Ross, J., dissenting).
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1983 decision, United States v. Riccobene.267 Deeming it unnecessary to
show that the enterprise has some function wholly unrelated to the
racketeering activity, the Riccobene court merely required proof that the
enterprise had an existence beyond that required merely to commit each act
charged as predicate racketeering offenses. 268 The court further explained
that "[t]he function of overseeing and coordinating the commission of
an on-going
several different predicate offenses and other activities on
269
basis" could satisfy RICO's separate existence requirement.
3. Tenth Circuit
In 1991, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit adopted the
Riccobene standard in United States v. Sanders.270 The defendant in
Sanders was brought to trial on thirty-two counts-including RICO
violations, heroin possession, and money laundering, among other
crimes. 27 1 The Sanders court, citing Turkette, first determined that while
the pattern of racketeering activity and the enterprise were separate
elements of a RICO violation, "the government need not necessarily adduce
different proof for each element. '272 The Sanders court, citing Riccobene,
found that the requirement that the enterprise be separate and distinct from
the pattern of racketeering activity could be met "if the evidence shows the
on
organization coordinated the commission of different predicate offenses274
an ongoing basis." 2 73 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the RICO convictions.
4. Fourth Circuit
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also requires an
ascertainable structure separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering
activity, as articulated in United States v. Tillett.275 There, the court, citing
Riccobene, found the proof was sufficient to convict marijuana smugglers
beyond that which was
because their "organization had an existence
276
necessary to commit the predicate crimes."

267. 709 F.2d 214, 223-24 (3d Cir. 1983), abrogated on other grounds by Griffin v.
United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 224.
270. 928 F.2d 940, 943 (10th Cir. 1991).
271. Id. at 942.
272. Id. at 943 (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981)).
273. Id. at 944 (citing Riccobene, 709 F.2d at 224).
274. Id.
275. 763 F.2d 628, 632 (4th Cir. 1985).
276. Id. (citing Riccobene, 709 F.2d at 223-24; United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647,
665 (8th Cir. 1982)).
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C. AscertainableStructure Without Separate or Distinct Goals or Purposes
(the Seventh Circuit)

The Seventh Circuit is in agreement that every RICO enterprise must
have some ascertainable structure, but as Judge Richard Posner wrote in
Limestone, "We grant that the view.., is not inevitable." 277 The Seventh
Circuit has been described as the middle ground in this circuit split,
requiring "that there be 'some' kind of ascertainable structure, but.., not...
278
that it be a separate structure."
277. Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 804 (7th Cir. 2008).
278. Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 550 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied,
128 S.Ct. 464 (2007); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 12. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Odom may have overstated the case, however. One of
the Seventh Circuit cases it cited, Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L.P., explicitly stated that
there "must be 'a structure and goals separate from the predicate acts themselves."' 52 F.3d
640, 645 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Korando, 29 F.3d 1114, 1117 (7th Cir.
1994)). The other, United States v. Rogers, made it clear that the enterprise and pattern
elements must be proven "separate and apart" from each other, but that proof of one may be
used to prove the other and that no goal or purpose "separate and apart" from the pattern is
needed to prove the enterprise. 89 F.3d 1326, 1336-37 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing United States
v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981)). Rogers never explicitly held that the structure itself
must be separate or distinct from the pattern of racketeering. See generallyid.
Nevertheless, it seems that the Seventh Circuit has staked a position unique from
other circuits requiring an ascertainable structure. To further illustrate this point, compare
the Pattern Criminal FederalJury Instructionsfor the Seventh Circuit with that of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The Pattern Criminal FederalJury Instructionsfor
the Seventh Circuit for an associated-in-fact enterprise under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) concludes
as follows: "The government must prove the association had some form or structure beyond
the minimum necessary to conduct the charged pattern of racketeering." COMM. ON FED.
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN CRIMINAL FEDERAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 271 (1998) [hereinafter SEVENTH CIRCUIT
INSTRUCTIONS], available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/pjury.pdf. In contrast, the Eighth
Circuit's model definition of enterprise concludes with, "The government must also prove

that the association had a structure distinct from that necessary to conduct the pattern of
racketeering activity." JUDICIAL COMM. ON MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EIGHTH
CIRCUIT, MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Instruction
6.18.1962D, at 367 (2008), available at
http://www.juryinstructions.ca8.uscourts.gov/crimmanual_2008_expanded.pdf
(citing
United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d
1193 (8th Cir. 1982)); see also CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM. OF THE U.S.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT, CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Instruction 2.74.3 cmt. at 250 (2005), available at http://www.calO.uscourts.gov/
downloads/pji 10-cir-crim.pdf (commenting that Turkette "suggest[ed] that the enterprise
must have an organization with a structure and goals separate from the predicate acts
themselves"). The Seventh Circuit's pattern jury instructions were approved on November
30, 1998, more than two years after Rogers. See SEVENTH CIRCUIT INSTRUCTIONS, supra.
Given that (1) the Rogers court held that no distinct goal or purpose is required, (2)
the Court in Turkette used the language "separate and apart" in its holding in 1981, and (3)
other circuits like the Eighth Circuit have emphasized the word "distinct" in determining
what kind of structure must be proven to satisfy the enterprise requirement, this Note
concludes that the Seventh Circuit occupies a middle ground in this three-way split. The
only proper inference, it seems, is that, had the Seventh Circuit wanted to use the words
"separate," "distinct," or "apart" in its pattern jury instructions, it would have done so. That
it did not leads one to believe that the phrase "beyond the minimum" is not to be equated
with the word "distinct." That said, it must also be noted that the U.S. Court of Appeals for
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At first glance, this position seems contrary to the maxim that RICO
requires the elements of "enterprise" and "pattern of racketeering" to be
proven separately. 279 However, Turkette held that an "enterprise" could
include illegal organizations or illegal associations-in-fact that have an
exclusively criminal purpose. 280 Further, as the Seventh Circuit found in
United States v. Rogers,28 1 an enterprise need not have something-such as
a legitimate business-separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering
activity. 282 Given that explicit rule of Turkette, the Seventh Circuit noted in
Rogers that the question then becomes whether proof of further illegal
activity that does not constitute a pattern of racketeering activity is
required. 28 3 The Seventh Circuit answered strongly in the negative: "If so,
they would have to be illegal purposes that are not predicate acts, because
under defendants' theory the purposes must be 'separate and apart' from the
the Third Circuit's pattern jury instruction on this issue is similar to the Seventh Circuit's.
See COMM. ON MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS THIRD CIRCUIT, MODEL CRIMINAL JURY

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Instruction 6.18.1962C-2, at 7 (2008), available at

http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/criminaljury/Chap%206%20RICO%20July%202008.pdf
("To
find that the enterprise was an entity separate and apart from the alleged pattern of
racketeering activity, you must find that the government proved that the enterprise had an
existence beyond what was necessary merely to commit the charged racketeering activity.").
After first making the Supreme Court generally aware of this three-way split-and
the Seventh Circuit's "[mliddle [c]ourse"-in the petition for a writ of certiorari, see Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 12, Boyle's attorney, Marc Fernich, subsequently
cited Seventh Circuit jury instructions approvingly in his reply brief. See Petitioner's Reply
Brief at 2-3, Boyle v. United States, No. 07-1309 (U.S. Jan. 6, 2009), 2009 WL 52429
(quoting Korando, 29 F.3d at 1118 (finding enterprise must have a structure "separate from
the commission of the predicate acts themselves"); United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362,
1367 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.) (finding jury "properly instructed" that "informal
enterprise" must "exist[] as an organization with a structure... separate from the predicate
acts themselves"); SEVENTH CIRCUIT INSTRUCTIONS, supra). Notably, both United States v.
Korando and United States v. Masters were decided before Rogers.
At oral argument, Fernich equated the Seventh Circuit jury instructions with those of
the Eighth Circuit. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Boyle, No. 07-1309 (U.S. Jan. 14,
2009), 2009 WL 86554 ("First of all, the charge that we are asking for specifically is a
charge that is given in the Seventh and Eighth Circuits which says a structure separate from
the commission of the predicate acts themselves."); id. at 16.
Given that Fernich was advocating the imposition of an ascertainable structure that
would be separate and distinct from the pattern of racketeering activity, this Note concludes
that equating the two circuits' pattern jury instructions blurred the extremely fine distinctions
that define this admittedly complex issue. At oral argument, Fernich later acknowledged
that the Seventh Circuit's cases have said that "it is not a high hurdle. They say it's a low
hurdle, and there has to be some structure, but not much-not much to distinguish between."
Id. at 20. This Note concludes that, from the petitioner's perspective, advocating the
Seventh Circuit's position is not equivalent to-or as advantageous as-the Eighth Circuit's
position, for the reasons described in this footnote. But circling back to the beginning of this
footnote, whether or not the Seventh Circuit indeed "does not require that it be a separate
structure" as the Ninth Circuit contended is, at least, a matter in question. Odom, 486 F.3d at
550.
279. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
280. Id. at 581-83.
281. 89 F.3d 1326.
282. Id. at 1337 ("No doubt proof of a legitimate business would be highly probative as to
the 'enterprise' element, but after Turkette we cannot say that it is required.").
283. Id.
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predicate acts [constituting a pattern of racketeering]. Requiring proof of
additional unlawful purposes that are not predicate offenses would 285
be
absurd. 284 The court also called such a requirement "nonsensical.
Were such a requirement met, "it would also run counter to the obvious
rationale behind defendants' argument: that an 'enterprise'
is something
286
more structured, more organized than a band of criminals."
The Seventh Circuit gradually developed this view. In the 1995 case
Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L.P.,287 the court wrote that enterprise
could be formal or informal and need not have "much structure, but the
enterprise must have some continuity and some differentiation of the roles
within it.' ' 2 88 Further, the enterprise must have "a structure and goals
separate from the predicate acts themselves. '289 One year later in Rogers,
the Seventh Circuit rejected appellants' argument that the enterprise is
required to have "a purpose separate and apart from the pattern of
racketeering activity, '290 calling the position "simply insupportable,"'29 1 as
explained above. 292 In Rogers, two men appealed their convictions for
"various drug-related activities, including murder in furtherance of a
continuing criminal enterprise and possession and distribution of
cocaine." 293 The Rogers court was careful to lay out its argument, noting
that "'enterprise' still requires more than a 'pattern of racketeering
activity.' . . . [T]he fact that a single individual may engage in a pattern of
racketeering activity without, of course, comprising an enterprise
adequately illustrates the inherent and logical distinction between the two
elements." 294 The Rogers court noted that "[t]he continuity of an informal
enterprise and the differentiation among roles can provide the requisite
'structure' to prove the element of 'enterprise."' 29 5 In so finding, Rogers
reiterated the Seventh Circuit's longtime position that "[t]he hallmark of an
296
enterprise is 'structure.'
In April 2008, the Seventh Circuit maintained the requirement of an
ascertainable structure in Limestone, rejecting the Ninth Circuit's contrary
view in Odom in May 2007.297 In Limestone, Judge Posner affirmed a
district court's holding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim against the

284. Id.

285. Id
286. Id.
287. 52 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 1995).
288. Id. at 645 (citing Burdette v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1379 (7th Cir. 1992)).
289. Id. (quoting United States v. Korando, 29 F.3d 1114, 1117 (7th Cir. 1994) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
290. Rogers, 89 F.3d at 1336.
291. Id.
292. See supra notes 281-86 and accompanying text.
293. Rogers, 89 F.3d at 1329.
294. Id. at 1337.
295. Id. (citing United States v. Korando, 29 F.3d 1114, 1117-18 (7th Cir. 1994)).
296. Id. (citing United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 500 (7th Cir. 1986)).
297. Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 804-05 (7th Cir. 2008).
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defendants, including public officials in Lemont, Illinois, in part
because he
298
did not put forth any evidence of an enterprise-like structure.
Judge Posner criticized the complaint while providing a road map to the
successful pleading of an enterprise in his circuit, pointing out that "[t]here
is no reference to a system of governance, an administrative hierarchy, a
joint planning committee, a board, a manager, a staff, headquarters,
personnel having differentiated functions, a budget, records, or any other
indicator of a legal or illegal enterprise." 299 He could not resist tweaking
the plaintiff while recognizing that illegal organizations fall well within the
scope of RICO, noting, "The Chicago Vice Lords would be embarrassed to
300
have so little structure."
By acknowledging "the view that every RICO enterprise must have a
structure is not inevitable,"130 1 Judge Posner seems to grant that the statute
may in fact be ambiguous. He did not, however, invoke the rule of
lenity. 30 2 He needed only to carefully read the language of the statute-and
did not invoke Congress's rule of construction that RICO should be broadly
construed to meet its remedial purposes as the Odom majority did 3 3-to
30 4
reach his conclusion.
Judge Posner believed that the critical analysis is in regards to where the
emphasis is placed within the § 1961(4) definition of enterprise, which
includes "any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not
a legal entity.

' 30 5

He believed that "[i]f emphasis is placed on 'associated

in fact,' no structure is necessary," as he noted that "some courts," such as
the Odom court, believed. 30 6 But he believed that such an analysis
"truncates the critical statutory language-'associated in fact although not a
legal entity'-misleadingly." 30 7 He observed that "[t]he juxtaposition of
the two phrases suggests that 'associated in fact' just means structured
30 8
without the aid of legally defined structural forms" such as a corporation,
and that this inference was reinforced by the mention of a list of legal
entities directly before the phrase "any union or group of individuals
associated in fact" in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).309 Judge Posner concluded this
analysis by stating, "Without a requirement of structure, 'enterprise'
3 10
collapses to 'conspiracy."
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. (citing United States v. Jackson, 207 F.3d 910, 914 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated and
remandedfor reconsiderationon other grounds, 531 U.S. 953 (2000)).
301. Id.

302. Id.
303. See supra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
304. Limestone, 520 F.3d at 804-05.
305. Id. at 804 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
306. Id. (citing Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 551 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc),
cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 464 (2007)).
307. Id.
308. Id. at 804-05.
309. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4); see also Limestone, 520 F.3d at 805.
310. Limestone, 520 F.3d at 805.
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Judge Posner then indicated that the Supreme Court's position in
Turkette backs this view, writing that "one is not surprised that the Supreme
Court has said that 'enterprise' is 'proved by evidence of an ongoing
organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various
associates function as a continuing unit."'' 3 11 He wrote that Richmond
reiterated that language. 3 12 Judge Posner cited cases in the Third, Fourth,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits "[t]o similar effect. '3 13 He found that the
3 14
allegations in the complaint were detailed but bereft of any structure.
Interestingly enough, in deciding the enterprise issue, he made no mention
of Rogers,3 15 which articulated that the enterprise need not have goals and
31 6
purposes separate and distinct from the pattern of racketeering.
D. The Facts and Positionsof Boyle
The Supreme Court has decided to weigh in on this disagreement among
the circuits, recently granting certiorari in Boyle. 3 17 The question presented
is whether an associated-in-fact enterprise needs an ascertainable structure
apart from the pattern of racketeering in which it engages. 3 18 This
"exceptionally important question" has broad implications on future
prosecutions and civil liability under RICO. 319 At issue is whether a bankburglary ring the government had dubbed the "Boyle Crew" qualifies as an
associated-in-fact enterprise. 320 A narrow reading of the enterprise element
would raise the proof threshold to only those associations with a distinct
ascertainable structure, while a broad reading opens the door for RICO
prosecutions of groups with a less rigid connection.
1. Statement of the Case
A jury in the Eastern District of New York convicted Edmund Boyle of
racketeering under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), racketeering conspiracy under 18
U.S.C. § 1962(d), bank burglary conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371, and
311. Id. (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981)).
312. Id. (citing Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L.P., 52 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 1995)).
Richmond held that an "enterprise is an ongoing structure of persons associated through

time, joined in purpose, and organized in a manner amenable to hierarchical or consensual
decision-making." Richmond, 52 F.3d at 644 (citing Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1440
(7th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

313. Limestone, 520 F.3d at 805 (citing Asa-Brandt, Inc. v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc.,
344 F.3d 738, 752 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir.
1991); United States v. Tillett, 763 F.2d 628, 632 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 223-24 (3d Cir. 1983)).

314.
315.
316.
317.

Id.
See generally id. at 804-05.
United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1337 (7th Cir. 1996).
United States v. Boyle, 283 F. App'x 825 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 29

(2008).

318.
319.
Winter
320.

Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 3, at I.
Carol Garfiel Freeman, Supreme Court Criminal Cases of Interest, CRIM. JUST.,
2009, at 52, 53; see also The Boyle Case & RICO Enterprises, supra note 18.
See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 3.
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several bank burglaries and attempted burglaries under 18 U.S.C. §
2113(a). 32 1 The charges arose from Boyle's involvement in a bank burglary
ring, a putative association-in-fact enterprise under the RICO statute that
the government called the "Boyle Crew." 322 Boyle was sentenced to 151
months of imprisonment. 323 The Second Circuit affirmed his conviction
324
but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing.
Boyle, along with seven other men based in the New York City area,
took part in a number of bank burglaries canvassing a minimum of five
states between 1991 and 1999.325
He and his cohorts would do
reconnaissance on banks that had a specific type of night deposit box that
they had figured out how to burglarize. 326 The crew targeted banks that
were near retail businesses such as shopping malls, because those banks
were likely to receive a large, steady stream of cash deposits. 327 They
"burglarize[d] those boxes in the early morning hours at the beginning of
the week
using crowbars, screwdrivers, fishing gaffs, and other burglar's
tools. '328 All of the crew members had some particular role such as a
lookout or burglar, they protected their identities by referring to each other
using aliases, and they often utilized walkie-talkies. 32 9 Their illegal gains
were doled out "based on the amount of risk inherent in each participant's
role." 330 The petitioner noted, however, that the Boyle Crew "was a loosely
affiliated 'clique' of 'friends'-wholly lacking role definition or
organizational structure-who
sporadically burgled night deposit boxes in
33 1
shifting combinations."
Government witnesses who testified under cooperation agreements in
exchange for leniency described the group "as an amorphous band of free
floaters without unifying plan or understanding-ongoing, formal, informal
or otherwise." 332 They testified that "different people" 333 were involved
"on an individual, ad hoc and impromptu basis-with no set crew or group
backing." 334 Additionally, there was accomplice testimony stating that
"[n]obody had any type of standing where he was the boss[;]... there was
no organization at all[;] . . . [e]ach individual crime withstood by
itself[;]... [t]here was no ongoing informal plan[;] .... [and] there was no
335
leadership or informal understanding among the group."
321. Id.

322. Id.
323. Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 3, at 5.
324. Id.

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

331. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1,at 3.

332.
333.
334.
335.

Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 4-5 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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At trial, Boyle asked for the following jury instruction:
To establish an association-in-fact enterprise, the government must
convince you, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the alleged Boyle Crew
had an ongoing organization, a core membership that functioned as a
continuing unit, and an ascertainable structural hierarchy distinct from the
charged predicate acts. If the government 336
fails to meet this burden, you
must acquit Mr. Boyle on the RICO counts.
The requested instruction was denied, 337 and the court instead mirrored
the language of both RICO and Turkette338 and told the jury, over objection,
"You may find an enterprise where an association of individuals, without
structural hierarchy, forms solely for the purpose of carrying out a pattern
of racketeering acts." 339 Following his conviction, Boyle challenged the
instruction on appeal. 340 He argued that his proposed jury charge was the
correct standard, under which the government's enterprise evidence was
legally insufficient to prove a valid association-in-fact distinct from the
alleged RICO pattern. 34 1 The Second Circuit "rejected the claim without
discussion," 342 confirmed his conviction, and vacated the sentence because
343
of an issue unrelated to this particular RICO question.
2. Boyle's Position
a. Petitionfor Certiorari
Boyle's attorney, Marc Fernich, made a number of interrelated arguments
in the petition for a writ of certiorari. 3 44 The petitioner argued that the
Second Circuit's approach that an associated-in-fact enterprise is
"functionally equivalent" to the sum of the underlying racketeering
"compounds and magnifies the concerns expressed by Justices Scalia and
34 5
Kennedy" in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.
The Second Circuit's approach, Fernich argued, severely lowers the
burden of proof.346 He argued that Turkette required distinctness for a good
reason, and this approach destroyed the distinctness rule, "dangerously
expanding RICO's already immense and much-maligned scope." 347 The
336. Id. at 6 (footnote omitted).
337. Id. (footnote omitted).
338. Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 3, at 3.
339. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 6 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
340. See id.
341. Id.
342. Id.; see also United States v. Boyle, 283 F. App'x 825, 826 (2d Cir. 2007) ("We
have considered the appellant's other challenges to the judgment of conviction and find them
without merit.").
343. Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 3, at 5.
344. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 7-19.
345. Id. at 8. For more on Scalia and Kennedy's concerns, see supra note 165.
346. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 8.
347. Id. at 14.
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Second Circuit's current position "mistakenly blends two discrete but
related inquiries, writing the key enterprise element out of the statute,
diluting the burden of persuasion and confounding Turkette's clear
thrust. '348
The Second Circuit's position, he continued, would
automatically convert every garden-variety conspiracy into a RICO offense,
complete with "enhanced
criminal penalties and the in terrorem threat of
' 34 9
treble damages."

Addressing policy, Femich further noted that many early RICO cases that
eschewed a structural component were decided when the basic parameters
of RICO were fluctuating and unresolved, when "the concepts of
relatedness and continuity generally [were] considered attributes of the
enterprise rather than the pattern," and when some courts also adorned the
enterprise element with "multiple scheme" and "economic motive"
requirements. 350 These latter "interpretative glosses," before they were
removed by the Supreme Court, alleviated the need for further
35
differentiation of the two key RICO elements: enterprise and pattem. '
Fernich also argued that a narrower intended sweep for RICO actually
conforms 2 with its policy purposes to "target[] a more sophisticated
35
crowd."
b. Boyle s Merit Brief
In the merit brief, the petitioner's research revealed that most circuit
courts required an ascertainable structure. 353 The petitioner then made the
following arguments:
348. Id. at 16.
349. Id. at 14 (citing United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 221 (3d Cir. 1983)).
350. Id. at 18.
351. Id. at 19.
352. Id. at 17 (quoting Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 555 (9th Cir. 2007) (en
banc) (Silverman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 464 (2007)).
353. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 238, at 6-7 ("[M]ost circuit courts correctly read
Turkette to require that an association-in-fact have some perceptible operating structure
aside-though permissibly inferable-from that inherent in the predicate acts themselves."
(citing United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 840 (6th Cir. 2006) ("ongoing structure of
persons associated through time, joined in purpose, and organized in ... manner amenable to
hierarchical or consensual decision-making" (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1266-67 (10th Cir. 2005) (ongoing
organization with decisional framework and control mechanism apart from pattern); United
States v. Richardson, 167 F.3d 621, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("some structure" necessary to
distinguish enterprise from "mere conspiracy" (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1337 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The hallmark of an
enterprise is structure." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Calcasieu
Marine Nat'l Bank v. Grant, 943 F.2d 1453, 1461-62 (5th Cir. 1991) (hierarchical or
consensual decision-making structure; continuity of structure and personnel); United States
v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 855-56 (8th Cir. 1987) (ascertainable structure distinct from that
inherent in pattern of racketeering; organizational pattern or system of authority providing
continuing directional mechanism); United States v. Tillett, 763 F.2d 628, 631 (4th Cir.
1985) ("continuity of structure and personality"); United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214,
222-24 (3d Cir. 1983) (hierarchical or consensual decision-making structure beyond that
necessary to commit each racketeering act)). But see United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343,
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(1) Logically and on its face, "Turkette's description of an
associative 'enterprise'-a separate 'entity' with 'ongoing
organization' and a 'continuing unit'
of associates-implicitly
354
assumes some degree of structure";
(2) A structure requirement is evident in (a) "the titles of RICO
and [OCCA]"; 355 (b) section 1962(c)'s text viewed under the
canon of antinullification; 3 56 (c) the context and plain meaning
of section 1961(4);357 (d) the element in the ancillary Violent
Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity (VICAR) statute
pertaining 358
to "maintain[ing] or increas[ing]" an enterprise
"position";
(e) the government's acknowledgment that
VICAR mandates an ascertainably structured enterprise
distinct from its predicate racketeering; 3 59 and (f) the
painstaking differentiation
between enterprise and conspiracy
360
under RICO and OCCA;
(3) A structure requirement squares with RICO's legislative
history, which focused on organized crime and its infiltration
of the structured
entities of business, labor unions, and
36 1
government;
363-64 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (structure need not be "particular or formal" (citation
omitted)).
354. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 238, at 22. Such a reading is consistent with the
Court's interpretations of RICO's other main elements: conduct, with respect to which the
Court required that an organic entity "operate or manage" an enterprise; and pattern, with
respect to which the Court read in an inference of continuity by a true criminal enterprise. Id.
(citing Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993); H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492
U.S. 229 (1989)).
355. Id.
356. Id. The petitioner asserted that a structured enterprise requirement empowers all of §
1962(c)'s terms and renders none redundant, consistent with the enduring doctrine that
avoids meaningless constructions and rejects statutory redundancy. The opposition view, he
argued, renders the enterprise element superfluous. Id. at 39-40.
357. Id. at 22.
358. Id. The petitioner cited to VICAR, which was "[p]assed in 1984 to 'complement'
RICO," to prove that structure is intrinsic in an enterprise. Id. at 44 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1959
(2006)); see also Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 238, at 44 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1959).
Since VICAR makes it illegal to gain entrance into, maintain, or increase position in "an
enterprise engaged in racketeering activity," an enterprise is thus an entity to which someone
can increase his stature or responsibility. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1959). Thus, the petitioner
argued, structure is inherent. Id. at 44-46.
359. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 238, at 22.
360. Id. "'[T]he objective of a RICO conspiracy is to assist the enterprise's involvement
in corrupt endeavors,' whereas the 'objective of the predicate conspiracy is confined to the
commission of a particular substantive offense."' United States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 292
n.7 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1135 (3d Cir. 1990)).
The petitioner opined that the approach of a minority of courts of appeals blurred the
distinction by "merging an enterprise with its pattern of predicate crimes." Brief for the
Petitioner, supra note 238, at 47.
361. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 238, at 22-23. The petitioner, like Judge Lynch,
argued that Congress's primary purpose in enacting RICO was to limit organized crime's
infiltration into legitimate businesses. See id.at 53-58; see also supra note 73 and
accompanying text.
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(4) A structure requirement syncs with "the realities of daily RICO
practice and will not impair the statute's enforcement, as the
government customarily proves362
enterprise structure as a pillar
of its RICO litigation strategy";
(5) Lenity compels an ascertainable-structure requirement to avoid
serious Fifth and Sixth Amendment problems-"involving
vagueness, lack of fair notice and relieving an essential
element of the government's burden of proof'-coinciding
with the government's view; 363 and

(6) "Boyle's conviction must be reversed for legal insufficiency
and instructional error, or the case remanded for application
of
'3 64
the ascertainable-structure test in the first instance."
The petitioner addressed the Turkette holding by deconstructing its
critical language. He pointed out that the Turkette Court twice emphasized
that the association-in-fact enterprise was "an entity," also noting that the
government in that case proposed that an "independent entity" must be
"shown" to satisfy the enterprise element. 365 The petitioner further noted
that the High Court also stressed twice in Turkette that the enterprise must
be separate and apart from the pattern of activity and imposed requirements
of an "ongoing organization" and a "continuing unit."'366 He then cited
common dictionary definitions of "entity" which suggests an entity "exists
36 7
as a particular and discrete unit" considered "apart from its properties."
Hence, an enterprise must be more than the sum of its parts-and the extra
something, the petitioner asserted, was structure. 368 For good measure, he
362. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 238, at 23. The petitioner asserted that, "[s]ince
the government is already proving enterprise structure in the bulk of cases, a structure
requirement will not make RICO charges harder to prosecute-an invalid objection in any
event." Id. at 62 n.52. The petitioner argued that the government should not "have it both
ways, reaping enormous tactical benefits from enterprise structure-powerful expert
testimony; damaging 'enterprise proof' exceeding Rule 404(b); prejudicial joinder of
defendants, charges and conspiracies; and a functionally extended statute of limitations"
while refusing to acknowledge that a structure requirement exists. Id. at 62.
363. Id. at 23.
364. Id.; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers in
Support of Petitioner, Boyle v. United States, No. 07-1309 (U.S. Nov. 28, 2008), 2008 WL
5079033; Brief of Center on the Administration of Criminal Law as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 186; Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America & McKesson Corporation as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at
32, Boyle v. United States, No. 07-1309 (U.S. Nov. 28, 2008), 2008 WL 5079031 (arguing
that, if the Court "[riejects [t]he [a]scertainable [s]tructure [i]nterpretation [o]f '[e]nterprise,'
[t]he Court [s]hould [m]ake [cllear [t]hat [an [a]ssociation-[i]n-[f]act [e]nterprise [m]ust
[ble [c]omprised [o]f [ilndividuals, [n]ot [clorporations [olr [o]ther [o]rganizations").
365. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 238, at 25 (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576, 583 & n.5 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
366. Id. (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S at 583) (internal quotation marks omitted).
367. Id. at 26 (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
615 (3d ed. 1996)).
368. Id. at 27. "Structure" is defined as "something having a definite or fixed pattern of
organization," or "the way in which the parts of something are put together or organized." Id.
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as "an 'organic structure' or 'purposive
found a definition of "organization"
369
systematic arrangement.",

Next, the petitioner claimed that a structure requirement is evident in all
things RICO, from the statute's title, its legislative history, and the
Structure is evident in RICO's
complementary VICAR statute. 3 70
"Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
considered statutory title:
Organizations Act," 37 1 which was part of the larger Organized Crime
Control Act. 372 The petitioner adopted Judge Posner's interpretation of §
1961(4), which hinged on the phrase "although not a legal entity. ' 373 This
interpretation equates the associated-in-fact enterprise with a legal entity
enterprise, which the petitioner argued was the implication of the language
in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4): "any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity. '3 74 He then argued that "Judge Posner's
interpretation finds additional support in the word 'union,' which
immediately precedes 'group of individuals associated in fact' in the second
clause." 375 As used in § 1961(4), the petitioner opined that "union" means
376
labor union.
The petitioner warned that the principles of lenity, constitutional
avoidance, and constitutional doubt justify his view, 377 noting that in recent
at 28 (quoting WEBSTER'S THiRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2267 (2002) [hereinafter
WEBSTER'S]).
369. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 238, at 27 (quoting WEBSTER'S, supra note 368,
at 1590).
370. Id. at 52 ("In sum, a structured enterprise requirement is manifest in the titles, terms,
context and framework of RICO, OCCA and VICAR, interpreted under cardinal
construction canons.").
371. Id. at 38 (citing United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805)
(Marshall, C.J.) (finding title generally relevant in statutory construction)); G. Robert
Blakey, The RICO Civil FraudAction in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 237, 258 n.59 (1982) (noting that title reflects RICO's full and "final scope");
Blakey & Gettings, supra note 66, at 1025 n.91 (stressing title's importance in interpreting
RICO).
372. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
373. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 238, at 41 (quoting Limestone Dev. Corp. v.
Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 804 (7th Cir. 2008)); see also supra notes 305-10 and
accompanying text.
374. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006); see also Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 238, at 41.
375. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 238, at 42.
376. Id. (footnote omitted) (collecting authorities).
377. Id. at 63. The canon of constitutional avoidance states that "[w]hen the validity of
an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and ...a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of
the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided." Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22, 62 (1932). "The canon of constitutional avoidance is sometimes also referred to as
the doctrine of constitutional doubt." Michael T. Crabb, Comment, "The Executive Branch
Shall Construe": The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance and the PresidentialSigning
Statement, 56 KAN. L. REv. 711, 720 n.63 (2008); see also Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla.
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (finding canon of
constitutional doubt stands for the proposition that when "an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe
the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress"). "The rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor
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years the Supreme Court has stressed a defendant's fundamental Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights "to have every essential element of a criminal
offense determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. '378 To avert these
constitutional issues, the petitioner argued that lenity necessitates an
enterprise structure distinct-"though provable in some cases from-that
attending its participants' predicate acts. '379 The liberal construction clause
of RICO, which mandates that the statute "shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes," does not require a different result. 380 He
noted that "[t]his would not be the first time the Court rejected an unbridled
38 1
view of RICO over liberal construction objection."
3. The Government's Argument
a. Opposition to Certiorari
Opposing the certiorari petition, the government argued that no
"ascertainable structure" requirement was found "in either Turkette or
RICO's text."'382

The government noted that Turkette allowed that "the

proof used to establish" the separate enterprise and pattern of racketeering
elements "may in particular cases coalesce. ' 383 Further, the government
pointed out that the jury instructions made clear that the government had to
prove "both the existence of a RICO enterprise and a pattern of racketeering
activity." 38 4

of the defendants subjected to them." United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008)
(citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-49 (1971); McBoyle v. United States, 283
U.S. 25, 27 (1931); United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917)).
378. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 238, at 63 (citing United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 230 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004); Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476-78 (2000)). "A construction that fuses enterprise and pattern,
effectively erasing enterprise from the statute, therefore implicates fundamental rights and
raises major constitutional concerns." Id. at 64. The petitioner further opined that,
to the extent that (A) 'associated in fact' is a cryptic locution that has riven the
circuits; (B) such an enterprise is deemed materially identical to, or wholly
inferable from, its pattern of predicate acts; and (C) the pattern concept itself is
certifiably vague, the minority approach raises significant notice problems under
the Fifth Amendment's due process clause.
Id. at 64-65 (footnote omitted).
379. Id. at 66; see also Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2025 (stating that the rule of lenity breaks
statutory ties in favor of defendants subjected to "ambiguous criminal laws").
380. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 238, at 66-67 (quoting Pub. L. No. 91-452, §
904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1970)).
381. Id. at 67 (citing Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 463 (2006)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S.
170, 186-87, 189 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
382. Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 3, at 6.
383. Id. (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981)).
384. Id. (citation omitted).
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The government further noted that at least four other circuits agreed with
the Second Circuit. 3 85 To the extent that other courts of appeals disagree
with the Second Circuit's view, the disagreement is both "superficial and
limited. '386 In other words, the new test would rarely result in a different
outcome. 387 The government argued that those courts that commonly
required an ascertainable structure applied the rule in a fashion consistent
with Turkette, which held that a RICO enterprise must be an "ongoing
organization" composed of associates who "function as a continuing
unit."'388 The government also asserted that these courts accept Turkette's
holding that "the same evidence can establish both the existence of a RICO
389
enterprise and a pattern of racketeering activity."
Further, the government pointed out that the Supreme Court recently
reiterated that it was "not at liberty to rewrite RICO to reflect ...views of
good policy" where "RICO's text provides no basis for imposing a...
requirement. '390 Finally, the government argued that if "ascertainable
structure" proof was required, the evidence introduced at Boyle's trial
would satisfy that requirement. 39 1 Members of Boyle's crew "had
particular roles in their spree of burglaries (which could be characterized as
an hierarchy), protected their identities
with false names, divided their
392
profits, and retained tools of the trade."
b. Government's Merit Brief
In its merit brief, the government argued that a RICO enterprise existsdespite no additional ascertainable structure-when a continuing unit of
people forms to carry out a pattern of racketeering activity. 393 The
government furthered this argument on the foundation that both RICO's
wording and its arrangement demonstrate that
an "enterprise" need not
3 94
possess an independent ascertainable structure.
The arguments in support of this contention were:

385. See id. at 7. Both sides seem to claim that the D.C. Circuit is on their side. See supra
note 238.
386. Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 3, at 9.
387. Id. at 8-9.
388. Id. at 8 (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583).
389. Id. Also, the government noted that Boyle did not identify any analogous case in
which the ascertainable-structure test led to a reversal. Id. at 9.
390. Id. at 7 (quoting Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 128 S.Ct. 2131, 2145
(2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
391. Id. at 10. Interestingly, this argument was not made in the government's merit brief.
See Brief for the United States at 51, Boyle v. United States, No. 07-1309 (U.S. Dec. 22,
2008), 2008 WL 5369540 ("Regardless of whether it lacked an ascertainable structure,
petitioner's enterprise had a common purpose and functioned as a continuing unit. ...
Although the enterprise lacked a distinct management structure, it operated in an organized
fashion.").
392. Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 3, at 10.
393. See Brief for the United States, supra note 391, at 14.
394. Id. at 16.
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(1) The definition of "enterprise" in RICO
395
ascertainable-structure requirement;

contains

no

(2) "'Enterprise"' and a 'pattern of racketeering activity' are
396
distinct concepts that do not merge";
(3) "An independent 'ascertainable structure' requirement is not
necessary to distinguish between conspiracy and RICO
397
offenses";
(4) "An independent 'ascertainable structure' requirement finds
no support" in the Supreme Court's Turkette, Reves, and H.J.
398
Inc. decisions;
(5) A "textual analysis of section 1961(4), like the title and
purpose of RICO, does not support an independent
'ascertainable structure' requirement"; 3 9 9 and
(6) RICO's purpose "does not support
'ascertainable structure' requirement. '400

an

independent

The government also argued that Boyle's other remaining contentions
were meritless, 40 1 and that it established a valid RICO enterprise in this

395. Id.
396. Id. at 25. The government dismissed the petitioner's argument that the enterprise
would collapse into the pattern of racketeering without an ascertainable-structure
requirement. Id. The government argued that the Turkette Court rebuffed a nearly identical
argument, stressing that the enterprise was "an entity separate and apart from the pattern of
activity" and that one can be proven without the other. Id. (quoting United States v. Turkette,
452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981)). It also pointed out that Turkette cautioned that merely because a
jury could infer the enterprise element from proof of the pattern-of-racketeering element
does not render the enterprise element superfluous. Id. at 27-28. Language "in a statute is
not rendered superfluous merely because in some contexts that language may not be
pertinent." Id. at 28 (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583 n.5).
The government also contended that even where some circuits required an
"ascertainable structure" to meet the enterprise element threshold, these circuits noted that an
enterprise's separateness and distinctness from a pattern of racketeering "is established by
other factors." Id. at 31-32 (citing United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 651-52 (3d Cir.
1993); United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Tillett,
763 F.2d 628, 632 (4th Cir. 1985)).
397. Id. at 34. The government differentiated between a conspiracy that violates 18
U.S.C. § 371 and a RICO enterprise. Id. at 34-35. "Conspiracy is an inchoate offense, the
essence of which is an agreement to commit an unlawful act." Id. at 35 (quoting lannelli v.
United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975)). "[C]riminal liability attaches 'regardless of
whether the crime agreed upon actually is committed."' Id. (quoting United States v. Feola,
420 U.S. 671, 694 (1975)). "By contrast, an association-in-fact enterprise, as Turkette makes
clear, is an organization or entity-whether formal or informal-that has an 'ongoing'
existence and whose members 'function as a continuing unit."' Id. (citing Turkette, 452 U.S.
at 583).
398. Id. at 38-40.
399. Id. at 41.
400. Id. at 43.
401. Id. at 46-47.
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case, even
if there was no independent ascertainable structure to the "Boyle
402
Crew."
The government claimed that the Supreme Court has concluded since
Turkette that RICO imposes no restriction on the associations embraced by
the definition of "enterprise" because an enterprise includes "any union or
group of individuals associated in fact."'403 The government asserted that
the word "any" is defined broadly. 40 4 The government then looked at the
RICO phrase "group of individuals associated in fact."' 4 05 It argued that the
term "group" is generally understood to be "'a number of individuals bound
together by a community of interest, purpose, or function' and, thus,
includes a collection of individuals 'associated formally or informally for a
common end."' 40 6 The government argued that what the Turkette Court
required for an enterprise-"a group of persons associated together for a
common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct," whether lawful or
criminal, proven by "evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or
informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a
continuing unit"-was sufficient. 40 7 Further, the government claimed that
Turkette's allowance that the proof used to establish a pattern of
racketeering activity and an enterprise "may in particular cases coalesce"
shows that the Court did not impose an extratextual limitation of an
ascertainable structure "beyond that reflected in the coordinated conduct of
the enterprise's affairs." 408 The government also found an alternative to the
'40 9
petitioner's definition of "organization.
Since a legal-entity enterprise could include "any individual," the
government argued that Congress could not have imposed an ascertainable
structure. 4 10 Likewise, since as few as two people could be an associatedin-fact enterprise, the respondent argued that Congress did not intend that

402. Id. at 51 ("The evidence ...was sufficient to establish that the charged associationin-fact qualified as a RICO enterprise. Regardless of whether it lacked an ascertainable
structure, petitioner's enterprise had a common purpose and functioned as a continuing
unit.").
403. Id. at 16 (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
404. Id.
405. Id. at 16-17; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006).
406. Brief for the United States, supra note 391, at 17 (quoting WEBSTER'S, supra note
368, at 1004). The government also argued that an "'association' . . . is understood as 'a
collection of persons who have joined together for a certain object."' Id. (quoting BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 156 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)).

407. Id. (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583) (internal quotation marks omitted).
408. Id. at 18 (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583) (internal quotation marks omitted).
409. Id. at 19 n.4 ("[W]hile the word 'organization' may be defined with reference to the
structure of an association of individuals, it may also be defined with reference to the
association's common purpose."); see also supranote 369 and accompanying text.
410. Brief for the United States, supra note 391, at 20-21. Contra Petitioner's Reply
Brief, supra note 278, at 26 (citing Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158,
165 (2001) (finding that the corporate form distinguishes a business enterprise from a sole
shareholder defendant)).
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enterprises must always include an ascertainable
smaller association-in-fact
41
structure. 1
The government contended that the petitioner should not have parsed the
language of the Supreme Court's string of RICO decisions in Turkette,
Reves, and H.J. Inc.,412 and that in any event the parsing did not support his
contention. 4 13 Even the petitioner's analysis of § 1961(4) did not support
an independent ascertainable-structure requirement, the respondent argued,
because the word "although" in the phrase "although not a legal entity"
merely brought enterprises that had no independent legal existence but were
associations in fact within the definition. 4 14 This argument was an explicit
rejection of Judge Posner's contention that the word "although" implied
"that the group is just 'structured without the aid of legally defined
structural forms such as the business corporation.' ' 4 15 The government
also dismissed the petitioner's contention that the word "organizations" in
the title of RICO carried a meaning that imposed an ascertainable-structure
4 16
requirement.
In the same vein, the government argued that the petitioner was wrong to
rely on the statutory purposes reflected in RICO's preamble and legislative

411. Brief for the United States, supra note 391, at 20 ("Two-person enterprises do not
require such attributes in order to operate effectively, and they would not necessarily be
expected to display them."). The government also noted that Congress explicitly addressed
size and structure in another statute within the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. Id. at
21. "Section 1955 defines an 'illegal gambling business' to mean a gambling business that,
among other things, 'involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage,
supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business."' Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. 1955(b)(1)(ii)
(2006)). RICO, though, left out "ascertainable structure" in its extensive list of definitions.
Id. at 22. Grafting such a requirement onto RICO, the government continued, would also
counteract the admonition that "'RICO is to be read broadly."' Id. at 23 (quoting Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985)). For that matter, the government argued
that the petitioner could not formulate "ascertainable structure" into a definite concept. Id. at
22-23. But cf Petitioner's Reply Brief, supra note 278, at 27 ("Similarly, the government's
claim that the prospect of two-member enterprises undermines any structure requirement
mistakenly assumes the structure must be 'formalistic.' In fact, two-person associations may
be structured in any number of informal ways, either generally (e.g., copartners;
principal/agent;
first
among
equals;
mentor/apprentice;
leader/subordinate;
beneficiary/nominee) or specifically, through fixed roles extending over time (e.g.,
buyer/seller; importer/exporter; wholesaler/retailer; supplier/distributor; briber/recipient;
thief/fence; triggerman/wheelman . . . pimp/prostitute . . . trafficker/launderer;

loan

shark/collector, [etc.])." (citations omitted)).
412. Brief for the United States, supra note 391, at 38. The government noted that "'the
language of an opinion is not always to be parsed as though we were dealing with language
of a statute' and, instead, must properly be 'read in context."' Id. (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341 (1979)).
413. Id. at 38-40.
414. Id. at41.
415. Id. (quoting Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 804-05 (7th
Cir. 2008)). The government also argued that, assuming that the word "union" in § 1961(4)
does mean labor union, it does not follow that any "group of individuals associated in fact"
must also have the same characteristics, be it a formalized structure or elected leaders. Id. at
42-43.
416. Id. at 43.
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history. 4 17 The statutory text was not ambiguous, the argument continued,
so there was no need to use extrinsic materials. 4' 8 The respondent
contended that the statute did not limit
its reach to organized-crime-type
4 19
enterprises, the respondent contended.
Finally, the government rejected the petitioner's argument to impose the
rule of lenity, contending that it was unnecessary because RICO is broad,
not ambiguous. 420 It also rejected the doctrine of constitutional avoidance
that the petitioner advocated because there was no merger danger that
421
would cause constitutional problems.
4. Boyle's Reply Brief
In the petitioner's reply brief, he noted that the government urged the
Supreme Court to adopt a rule even more expansive than the Second
Circuit's, and that the government contended that proof of a RICO pattern
will "always" establish an illicit associated-in-fact enterprise under 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c). 422 This argument, he noted, is directly in contradiction to
Turkette's mandate that the enterprise and pattern be proven separately, and
the petitioner noted that the government's apparent position "isan
423
extraordinary proposition."

417. Id. at 43-44.
418. Id. at 44. Further, the "petitioner's contentions are foreclosed by this Court's
decision in H.J. Inc. The Court there held that a RICO defendant's 'pattern of racketeering
activity' need not be characteristic of organized crime or an organized-crime-type
perpetrator." Id. (citing H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 244-49 (1989)).
419. Id. The government opined that the "ability of RICO to reach groups of criminals
who operate over time even without formal structure or relationships other than their
criminal endeavors is critical to achieving RICO's goals." Id. at 28. The government argued
that "legislative history shows that Congress deliberately rejected an organized crime
limitation on the statute's scope, opting instead for 'language capable of extending beyond
organized crime."' Id. at 45 (quoting H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 246). "Moreover, the Court in
H.J. Inc. concluded that a RICO pattern need not be indicative of an organized crime
perpetrator 'in either a traditional or functional sense."' Id. at 46 (quoting H.J. Inc., 492 U.S.
at 244). "H.J. Inc. therefore stands for the proposition that the broad scope of the RICO
statute may not be limited by reference to the statute's overriding purpose of eradicating
organized crime." Id.
420. See id. at 49-50.
421. Id. at 50 ("While statutes should be construed, where possible, to avoid
constitutional questions, that interpretive [canon] has no application here. Petitioner
contends that, without an 'ascertainable structure' requirement, the RICO statute would
unconstitutionally remove the enterprise element from the jury's consideration and render
RICO unconstitutionally vague. Both arguments rest on the premise that a structural
requirement is necessary to prevent RICO's enterprise and 'pattern of racketeering activity'
elements from merging. But, as shown above, the absence of such a requirement presents no
'merger' problem." (citations omitted)).
422. Petitioner's Reply Brief, supra note 278, at 6-7 ("It may well be true that, when a
multi-member association-in-fact exists to commit crimes and their crimes form a RICO
'pattern,' a jury could always infer the existence of an enterprise." (quoting Brief for the
United States, supra note 391, at 27) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
423. Id. at 6-7.
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5. Oral Argument
On January 14, 2009, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments by the
parties. 424 Fernich began by arguing that there should be a distinct
ascertainable-structure requirement to differentiate enterprise from pattern,
and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg quickly asked him if the only issue was
the improper jury instructions at trial or whether there was insufficient
evidence of enterprise for the case to go to jury. 42 5 Fernich replied that the
evidence was legally insufficient but the jury instruction was his main
contention. 426 After clearing up the scope of the jury charge error in
response to a question from Justice Samuel Alito, Fernich answered a
hypothetical from Justice Antonin Scalia about whether a "group of bank
robbers with various roles would constitute an enterprise under petitioner's
definition." 4 27 Boyle's attorney posited that they would not, since they had
4 28
no ongoing decisional apparatus or continuing directional mechanism.
Justice Anthony Kennedy then noted that the petitioner's use of Turkette
seemed to "interpolate additional requirements." 429 Fernich answered that
he did not contend that Turkette is directly controlling, but argued that the
Court there held that a structure requirement was implicit. 430 Justice
Ginsburg asked what the minimum to qualify as having a structure was, and
Fernich answered that the minimum was "a separate, ongoing, continuing
existence apart from the commission of the predicate acts themselves, and
the members necessary to commit those predicate acts." 43 1 He specified
that "an ongoing directional mechanism, a continuing decision-making unit,
and some sort of coherent existence between the commission of the
432
racketeering acts" themselves were three bare minimum ingredients.
When Justice Ginsburg later observed that "Boyle's group possessed
qualities similar to those examples, such as longevity, modus operandi, and
division of labor," Fernich responded "that the longevity aspect was still in
4 33
dispute."
When Justice Scalia asked what the need is for a hierarchy or boss-as
opposed to a democratic mob-Fernich noted that he objected to the jury
instruction in its entirety and did not press the contention that hierarchical
structure is an irreducible minimum. 434 Justice Souter noted that an
424. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 278.
425. Id. at 3-4.
426. Posting of Eliza Presson to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/oralargument-recap-boyle-v-us/ (Jan. 27, 2009, 3:41 PM) (posting Stanford Law School student
JP Schnapper-Casteras' recap of the Boyle oral argument).
427. Id.
428. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 278, at 6.
429. Presson, supra note 426.
430. Id.
431. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 278, at 7-8.
432. Presson, supra note 426.
433. Id.
434. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 278, at 11-12; see also Presson, supra note
426.
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individual can be an enterprise and opined that in such a case a one-man
enterprise "has got to have all the formal characteristics that you talk
about. '435 He argued that might be difficult for issuing meaningful jury
instructions. 436 Fernich countered "that RICO does not define an individual
as an association-in-fact enterprise and instead ...[categorizes] individuals
437
as a legal enterprise."
Justice Ginsburg asked whether street gangs would qualify under his
proposed definition, and Fernich answered that they would. 43 8 Justice Alito

asked what was needed to be shown, if not hierarchy. 439 Fernich answered
that the pattern jury instructions of the Seventh and Eighth Circuit charge
the jury "that there has to be a structure separate from the commission of
the predicate acts themselves." 440 When Justice Kennedy argued that Boyle
and his group fit exactly into Femich's requested definition, Boyle's
attorney argued that there was "no structure aside from that which is a
44 1
necessary incident to the commission of each racketeering act."
Justice Breyer asked whether Fernich would be amenable to a definition
of structure that encompassed rules, understandings, or behaviors that tend
to keep the associated-in-fact enterprise together over time beyond those
required to commit the underlying crimes. 442 Boyle's attorney answered
443
that it was a satisfactory definition.
Anthony Yang, arguing for the government, argued that the associatedin-fact enterprise needs no ascertainable structure distinct from the
underlying pattern, evoking RICO's statutory text and the Court's
interpretation of the text in drawing that conclusion. 444 Justice Scalia noted
that "it might be problematic if a mere pattern of acts constitutes an
enterprise. '"44 5 Yang responded by claiming that Boyle's argument that
enterprise merges with pattern was incorrect, since a pattern can be
established by acts committed by an individual, while the associated-in-fact
enterprise is the group. 446

In response to a question from Justice Alito,

Yang responded that an individual can engage in a pattern of racketeering
without participating in the affairs of an enterprise, since the pattern of
447
racketeering constitutes the underlying crimes.
Justice Ginsburg asked Yang whether the three different formulas by the
various circuits practically produce different results. 448 Yang said it would
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.

Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 278, at 14.
Id. at 12-14; see also Presson, supra note 426.
Presson, supra note 426.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 278, at 15-16.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id.at 17.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
Presson, supra note 426.
Id.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 278, at 29-30.
Id. at 37.
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make a difference in some cases, such as loosely knit gangs with no
hierarchy, and would lead to "a long course of case-by-case
adjudication." 449 Justice Breyer noted that "the object is to find a way of
not overextending RICO where there is nothing there but a conspiracy to
commit two crimes." 450 Justice Breyer, after going back and forth with
Yang over various hypotheticals, concluded that a "common garden-variety
conspiracy to[,] say, rob a bank and then transport
the money a few months
45 1
later" should not be within the reach of RICO.
When Justice Scalia provided a pattern jury charge that "you must find
an organization separate from the mere commission of the predicate acts,"
Yang responded, "What does that mean?" 452 Justice Scalia answered, "I
don't know," and there was laughter.4 53 Yang introduced a hypothetical of
"a group that formed only to commit predicate acts of racketeering over a
10-year period. '454 He argued that "[i]t would be anomalous to exclude a
group that committed only predicate acts, but to include a group that was
only partially racketeering but wholly criminal. Chief Justice [John]
Roberts disagreed, because RICO was aimed not just at crimes but also
'455
certain types of organizations.
On rebuttal, Fernich argued that the lower courts have misread
Turkette.4 56 He further noted that "the government presses its principal
definition of an enterprise in its brief'--the inclusion of "common
purpose," which is "the hallmark of a conspiracy." 4 57 He finished in
addressing the purpose underlying RICO, arguing that it was "very
458
significant" that bank burglaries are not predicate acts under RICO.
Yang had earlier pointed out that, while Boyle and his group were
committing bank burglaries, the predicate acts under RICO involved the
interstate transportation of stolen funds. 459 Fernich argued that Congress
made a judgment that bank burglaries are adequately handled by the states
and "that the State's can prosecute them. And the reason why the three bank
burglaries had to be [dressed] up as interstate transportation of stolen
money is [that] this is not really a case in which RICO is properly
460
invoked."

449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.

Id. at 37-38.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 45.
Id.
Presson, supra note 426.
Id.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 278, at 50.
Id. at 51-52; see also Presson, supra note 426.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 278, at 53.
Id. at 35.

460. Id. at 53-54.
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III. RECOMMENDING A PRAGMATIC ASCERTAINABLE-STRUCTURE
REQUIREMENT

This Note has detailed the history of RICO and the enterprise element, as
well as the three-way circuit split regarding the proof needed to prove an
associated-in-fact enterprise and the various arguments of the parties in
Boyle. The most appropriate course of action is for the Supreme Court to
adopt the Seventh Circuit's analysis that something beyond conspiracy must
46 1
be proved if RICO is to have the thrust it was originally intended to have.
In other words, proof of an ascertainable structure beyond the minimum
necessary to conduct the underlying crimes should be required to prove the
enterprise element. 462 However, Turkette's instruction that the proof of
both the enterprise and the pattern of racketeering elements will in some
cases "coalesce" 463 demands the conclusion that evidence of an enterprise
need not include any goals or any purpose separate and distinct from the
pattern of racketeering, as the Seventh Circuit held in Rogers.464 This
important restriction frees prosecutors and plaintiffs from an overly narrow
definition of enterprise.
This middle course is based on the most logical reading of the statute and
Turkette, although RICO's legislative history could also be considered
depending on whether the statute itself is considered ambiguous. This
Seventh Circuit standard is both the proper reading of the statute and within
the broad and flexible parameters initially set out by Congress when RICO
was enacted.
Part III examines the considerations for adopting this view, both in the
plain reading of RICO, its legislative history and statutory construction, and
the Supreme Court cases interpreting it. This part also discusses how an
ascertainable-structure requirement is intertwined with the majority view of
the circuits and will not disrupt RICO's enforcement. Finally, this part
discusses the policy grounds for articulating this requirement, citing the
principles of lenity and constitutional avoidance. The best argument against
such a requirement is that there is nothing explicitly in either RICO or
Turkette that mentions an ascertainable structure. But where a plain
meaning can be implied even where not explicit--or where historical (or
constitutional) forces compel the implied meaning-this argument is
rendered meritless.
Part III.A argues that a practical reading of RICO and Turkette is
sufficient to install the requirement. Part III.B opines that the statutory
construction and legislative history also support this view. Part III.C argues
that the minority view is not persuasive, and the Seventh Circuit view will
not disrupt RICO's enforcement. Part III.D argues that policy concerns
over prosecutorial discretion and potential constitutional problems
461.
462.
463.
464.

United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1337 (7th Cir. 1996).
See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
Rogers, 89 F.3d at 1337.

1992

FORDHA M LAW RE VIE W

[Vol. 77

regarding void for vagueness warrant the consideration of the rule of lenity
and the canon of constitutional avoidance.
A. PracticalReading of RICO and Turkette Is Proper
RICO, it is true, never imposes an "ascertainable structure" requirement
on associated-in-fact enterprises. 4 65 However, it is a short step, and not a
giant leap, to infer the requirement on these enterprises. First, start with the
title: "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations" fairly shouts that
the statute is about organized, as opposed to ad hoc, criminality-as does
the title of the Organized Crime Control Act.4 66 Since, as Edmund Boyle's
attorney pointed out in his merit brief, organization and structure can be
synonymous, 46 7 it is no reach to infer that some hierarchical entity is
involved.
Next, the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) implies that "associated-in-fact"
enterprises are on equal ground with legal-entity enterprises. 468 That statute
reads, "'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity." 4 69 Judge Posner correctly
deduced that, if emphasis is placed on "association in fact," no ascertainable
structure is necessary-the view of Odom and the cases it cited. 470 But, as
Judge Posner noted, "that truncates the critical statutory language
'associated in fact although not a legal entity'-misleadingly." 47 1 Judge
Posner found that the "juxtaposition of the two phrases" implies that
"associated in fact" simply means "structured without the aid of legally
defined structural forms" such as a corporation. 472 He believed this
inference was reinforced by the mention of a list of legal entities directly
before the phrase "any union or group of individuals associated in fact" in
18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). 473 Moreover, the conclusion that a union is a labor
union that, like a corporation, has an inherent structure, further bolsters this
point. 474 The associated-in-fact enterprise is not narrowed by the
ascertainable-structure interpretation, as Odom purports; it is merely put on
equal footing with legal-entity enterprises. 475 Judge Posner concluded that
"[w]ithout a requirement of structure, 'enterprise' collapses to
4 76
'conspiracy."'
465. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006).
466. See supra notes 370-72 and accompanying text.
467. See supra note 369 and accompanying text.
468. See supra notes 306-09 and accompanying text.
469. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
470. Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Viii. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 804 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation

omitted).
471. Id.

472. Id. at 804-05.
473. Id. at 805 (internal quotation marks omitted).
474. See supra note 376 and accompanying text.
475. See supra notes 308-09 and accompanying text.
476. Limestone, 520 F.3d at 805.
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4 77
Consider further the logic behind a practical reading of Turkette.
Legal entities have natural structures and hierarchies. 4 78 Similar to this, the
Turkette Court imposed "common purpose," "ongoing organization," and
"continuing unit" requirements on associated-in-fact enterprises, which
suggests the same or similar structure. 479 An entity without a defined
purpose, direction, or organization cannot hold together for very long and
will likely fall short of this element.
The best interpretation of Turkette was seen by the Seventh Circuit in
Rogers, which imposed a unique enterprise proof requirement that did not
4 80
need to have a goal separate and distinct from the pattern of racketeering.
Two aspects of the Turkette holding compel this conclusion. First, as
Turkette explicitly allowed wholly illegitimate organizations to be within
the purview of RICO-the Act is "equally applicable to a criminal
48 1
enterprise that has no legitimate dimension or has yet to acquire one" -it
did not require any additional legitimate arm of an enterprise. Thus, it
would be "absurd" to require an additional illegal structure of an enterprise
that is not part of the predicate acts. 48 2 The government would need to dig
up and accuse a defendant of illicit activity not for the sake of charging him
with any crime, but for the sake of proving an element of RICO. 48 3 In other
words, it is not appropriate, under Turkette, to require evidence of an
enterprise with goals or purposes that are separate and distinct from the
the untenable conclusion against
predicate acts. Doing so would result in 484
an illegitimate organization just described.
A second part of the Turkette holding bolsters this view-the idea that
proof of the pattern of racketeering and the enterprise will in some cases
coalesce. 48 5 In other words, there will occasionally be instances where a
wholly illegitimate organization has no distinct structure, but where the
evidence of the crimes the enterprise commits will also prove the
hierarchical structure. Since this was explicitly allowed under Turkette, it
would not be proper to mandate an evidentiary requirement that any
structured enterprise must have a separate and distinct goal or purpose. For
due process reasons, the government must prove the elements separately;
this is different than mandating that the evidence must be one hundred
percent completely distinguishable-or even one percent.

477. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.

See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
See supra notes 281-86 and accompanying text.
Turkette, 452 U.S. at 591.
United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1337 (7th Cir. 1996).

483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
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B. Statutory History and Purpose Also Support the Seventh Circuit's View
The previous view of the Supreme Court that RICO's enterprise element
is not ambiguous 4 86 is simply incorrect. To hold so is to view the naked
emperor and remark on his majestic clothes. It is frustrating to watch lower
courts argue about the statute, coming to completely contradictory views
within a matter of years within the same circuit. 4 87 But while courts of
appeals may not agree on the RICO enterprise element-splitting as many
as three ways-all of them think that they have discerned the proper
meaning of this unambiguous statute. This posturing and flailing about
only compounds a serious problem. The three-way circuit split that has
resulted since Turkette speaks for itself on the matter of clarity. Moreover,
that highly interested attorneys cannot even agree which circuit has held
what with respect to the RICO enterprise proof requirement is perhaps the
4 88
clearest example of confusion.
Based on precedent, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will finally
declare that the statute meets the threshold of being ambiguous as a matter
of law. It is far more likely that the Court will simply find that it requires
close statutory interpretation. If, though, the Supreme Court was to finally
announce the statute's ambiguity, it would be freed to look at the statutory
history and purposes behind RICO. This, too, would allow for adoption of
the Seventh Circuit's position.
RICO was initially adopted to prevent the infiltration by organized crime
of legitimate businesses. 4 89 Far afield from those original purposes due to
an overly broad construction and civil and prosecutorial zeal, it may now be
time to decide how far Congress intended RICO to go. Obviously, there
was some general impetus to squelch organized crime, to the extent that one
statute could do so. 490 Common sense-or a practical reading of the history
and basis for RICO-would lead to the conclusion that RICO did not intend
for Best Buy and Microsoft to be considered a racketeering enterprise for
performing an admittedly duplicitous fraud on consumers as in Odom. 49 1 In
other words, an ascertainable structure is required to separate racketeers
from defendants who could have never been conjured up by Senators
Hruska and McClellan in 1970.
Further, RICO's liberal construction clause, providing that the statute
"shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes," does not
foreclose this result. 4 92 The Court has previously "rejected an unbridled
486. See id. at 587-88 n.10 ("no ambiguity in the RICO provisions at issue here"); see
also supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
487. Compare Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 551 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 464 (2007), with Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1299 (9th Cir. 1996)
(finding that "it is sufficient to show that the organization has an existence beyond that
which is merely necessary to commit the predicate acts of racketeering").
488. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
489. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
490. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
491. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
492. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1970).
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view of RICO over [a] liberal construction objection. '493 Since the Court
decided Reves and Scheidler within a year of one another, it seems logical
to assume that the Court will choose whether to restrict the enterprise
element on a case-by-case basis. While it is true that the Court has refused
to restrict the enterprise element in the past, this does not portend that all
future restrictive interpretations will be foreclosed. Consider, too, Femich's
argument that many early RICO cases shunned any structural requirement
because (1) RICO's basic parameters were unsettled, (2) the concepts of
relatedness and continuity were generally considered attributes of the
enterprise rather than the pattern, and (3) "multiple scheme" and "economic
motive" requirements were added as interpretative glosses (until overruled)
494
as alternative means of ensuring an enterprise's continuing organization.
The Seventh Circuit's view is proper because it would finally and
explicitly define the enterprise element and thus narrow the overwhelming
scope of RICO. Whether this "beyond the minimum" requirement for an
ascertainable structure is equivalent to holding that the ascertainable
structure must be separate and distinct from the pattern of racketeeringand thus whether it answers the question presented in Boyle in the
affirmative-is a matter open to debate. 495 On the one hand, Fernich
equated the Seventh Circuit's pattern jury instruction with that of the Eighth
Circuit at oral argument in Boyle, even though the instructions use
decidedly different language. 496 On the other hand, other circuits and
attorneys view the Seventh Circuit as requiring an ascertainable structure
that is not separate and distinct from the pattern of racketeering, and
49 7
Fernich used this characterization in his petition for a writ of certiorari.
This Note contends that it is a slightly lesser standard that need not make
the ascertainable structure distinct from the pattern of racketeering.
Underlying crimes, even those that form a pattern of racketeering under
RICO, can be accomplished with a bare minimum of guile, cohesion,
planning, or structure; that the Seventh Circuit requires more is not
4 98
necessarily equivalent to requiring a separate and distinct standard.
Irrespective of how one views the above distinction, the additional
imposition that an enterprise needs no separate and distinct goals or

493. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 238, at 67 (citing Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply
Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 463 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 186-87, 189 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
494. See supra note 350 and accompanying text.
495. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
496. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
497. See also NASCAT Brief for Respondent, supra note 73, at 21-22 n.15; see supra
note 278 and accompanying text.
498. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1337 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that
"[t]here must be some structure, to distinguish an enterprise from a mere conspiracy, but
there need not be much" (quoting United States v. Korando, 29 F.3d 1114, 1117 (7th Cir.
1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 278, at
20 ("[T]he cases out of the Seventh Circuit say it is not a high hurdle. They say it's a low
hurdle ....
9).
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purposes results in a further defined statute and adherence to Turkette,4 99
which is a win-win proposition for virtually everyone (except committed
racketeers).
C. None of the ContraryArguments Are Sufficiently Persuasive
1. The Ninth Circuit's Analysis Was Incorrect
Odom is the most recent minority view on the issue, and the Odom
court's logic is based on an overly myopic view of RICO, an overly strict
reading of Turkette, and incorrect conclusions drawn from legislative
history. 50 0 Odom's focus on the phrase "associated in fact" ignores the
qualifier "although not a legal entity" right after it, which in all common
sense equates the two types of enterprises. 50 1 Further, Odom reads
Turkette's elements too strictly, concluding that an associated-in-fact
enterprise can have "ongoing organization" and "continuing unit" without
structure. As Fernich explained from a definitional reading of these words,
structure is implied throughout. 50 2 Finally, Odom concludes that Congress
must change the statute if there is dissatisfaction with the fact that civil
plaintiffs are not taking on illegitimate mobsters-but rather legitimate
entities. 50 3 But where statutory phrases are ambiguous, the Supreme Court
has sometimes looked to the common law for an interpretation
of the term,
504
and has sometimes chosen the narrower construction.
2. Arguments by the Government Were Unpersuasive
The assertions in the government's briefs in Boyle are similarly
unpersuasive. Any argument that RICO works fine-since any enterpriseproof requirement distinctions are minor 5 0 5 -is unsound and can be turned
on its head. The fact remains that the majority view requires some
ascertainable structure. 50 6 Thus, it is the leading paradigm in a system
where even its critics admit the system works fine. 50 7 Hence, it seems
possible to infer that no problems would be created in a broadening of this
majority view, but rather all inconsistency and uncertainty would be
avoided.
Next, consider the arguments that no "associated-in-fact" enterprise
should be required to have an ascertainable structure, because neither a
499. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981); see also supra notes 280-86
and accompanying text.
500. See supra notes 227-32 and accompanying text.
501. Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 804-05 (7th Cir. 2008).
502. See supra notes 365-69 and accompanying text.
503. See Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 553 (9th Cir. 2007) (en bane), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 464 (2007).
504. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.

505. See supra notes 386-87 and accompanying text.
506. See supra Part II.B.

507. See supra notes 386-87 and accompanying text.
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legal entity of one person nor an "associated-in-fact" enterprise of two
people could have one. In the first instance, common sense dictates that if
one individual is determined to be a "legal entity" enterprise by a court, in
all likelihood that individual is a sole proprietor or incorporated. 50 8 Thus,
among other things, the individual likely has a "headquarters," "budget"
and/or "records," which Judge Posner explicitly proffered as "indicator[s]of
a legal or illegal enterprise." 50 9 Thus, this argument is particularly
specious.
In the second instance, consider the two-person "associated-in-fact"
enterprise the government used as an example. The government argued that
"Congress could not have intended that such smaller association-in-fact
enterprises must always include" 510 an ascertainable structure, because
these enterprises "do not require such attributes in order to operate
5 11
effectively, and they would not necessarily be expected to display them."
The government seems to mistakenly assume that only formalistic
structures would suffice, which is simply not the case. 5 12 Turkette allowed
for formal or informal organization of an enterprise 5 13 and, as Boyle's
attorney points out, there are a whole host of tandems that would qualify:
mentor/apprentice, briber/recipient, thief/fence, triggerman/wheelman,
pimp/prostitute, trafficker/launderer, and loan shark/collector to name but a
few. 5 14 Once again citing Judge Posner, a headquarters, budget, and
records would be proof of an ascertainable structure, as would "a system of
governance, an administrative hierarchy, a joint planning committee..,
a
515
manager [or] . . . personnel having differentiated functions."
Another of the government's arguments-that no ascertainable structure
is needed to distinguish RICO enterprises from conspiracies 5 l 6-is
incorrect. An ascertainable structure would be the easiest way to make sure
enterprise did not collapse into conspiracy-as Judge Posner warned it
otherwise would. 5 17 Similarly, the government's argument that enterprise
would not collapse into the pattern of racketeering activity is not
compelling. The Turkette Court twice noted that the enterprise is an entity
separate and distinct from the pattern of racketeering, 5 18 yet different
circuits have established different guidelines post-Turkette on how to prove
an "associated-in-fact" enterprise. 5 19 Given that the proof in some cases
could coalesce-and thus a less-than-diligent fact-finder could conclude, as
508. See Petitioner's Reply Brief, supra note 278, at 26 (citing Cedric Kushner
Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 165 (2001)).
509. Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 804 (7th Cir. 2008).
510. See Brief for the United States, supra note 391, at 20.
511. Id.
512. See supra note 411 and accompanying text.

513.
514.
515.
516.

United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
See Petitioner's Reply Brief, supra note 278, at 27.
Limestone, 520 F.3d at 804.
See supra note 397 and accompanying text.

517. Limestone, 520 F.3d at 805.

518. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
519. See supra Parts II.A-C.
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the Second Circuit has, that "RICO charges may be proven even when the
enterprise and predicate acts are 'functionally equivalent' 520-the proper
solution is to incorporate the majority view and impose an ascertainable
structure. That some circuits with this requirement find separateness
elsewhere 52 1 is not a compelling reason for the Supreme Court to hold
otherwise.
Finally, the notion that the title and purpose of RICO do not support an
ascertainable-structure requirement (which would slightly narrow the
statute's scope) are best answered by the research and conclusions of Judge
Lynch, who opines that, while careful commentators have concluded that
Congress intended RICO specifically to address the problem of criminal
infiltration of legitimate enterprises, those that have found "much broader
purposes" in RICO's historical background-and "have used their findings
'522 It must
to justify sweeping interpretations of the statute"-are "wrong.
also be noted that no less an authority than former Chief Justice John
Marshall wrote that a statute's title is generally relevant to statutory
523
construction.
D. Strong Policy ConsiderationsMerit This Resolution
Judge Lynch recognized twenty years ago that not only was there a need
for a structural requirement for the enterprise element of RICO, but that
Congress was unlikely to ratchet down RICO, so to speak. 524 Although the
Supreme Court cannot follow its desire on policy grounds, 525 strong policy
considerations merit this move. For this reason, the Court must act as it did
in Reves, when it narrowed the scope of who could be prosecuted under §
526
1962(c) to people who operated or managed the RICO enterprise.
1. Reliance on Prosecutorial Discretion Is Insufficient and Dangerous
To leave RICO "associated-in-fact" enterprises vague-and essentially
rely on prosecutorial discretion in criminal trials-is unsound for a number
of reasons. The reliance on a benevolent U.S. Attorney's Office is
misguided. It is similar to the government's losing argument in opposition
to certiorari in Boyle that even if there are distinctions among the circuits,
they are minor or trifling distinctions that should not trouble the Supreme

520. United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 853 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting United States
v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 57 (2d Cir. 1983)); see also supra note 214 and accompanying text.
521. See Brief for the United States, supra note 391, at 31-32; see also supra note 396
and accompanying text.

522. Lynch, supra note 33, at 664.
523. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805) (title generally relevant in
statutory construction); see supra note 371 and accompanying text.
524. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
525. See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 128 S. Ct. 2131, 2145 (2008)
("Whatever the merits of petitioners' arguments as a policy matter, we are not at liberty to
rewrite RICO to reflect their--or our-views of good policy.").
526. See supra notes 155-64 and accompanying text.
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Any circuit confusion is something that the Supreme Court
should, when it grants certiorari, do everything in its power to resolve.
While the United States Attorneys' Manual suggests explicit respect for
state law, surely the harms of an overly broad prosecution philosophy are
the unwritten anchor of the guidelines. 528 The false assumption is that the
U.S. Attorney's office will always treat RICO in a like-minded, evenhanded manner across the country and over the coming months and years.
Certain prosecution tactics come in and out of vogue; if anything, RICO is
the prime example of this. For example, in Bledsoe, the government argued
"that any association of individuals can be an enterprise. '529 Relying on the
discretion and a narrow application of RICO today could evaporate in the
future, and the Supreme Court will have lost this golden opportunity to
further illuminate.
Moreover, reliance on prosecutorial discretion only solves half the
problem: if the past is prologue, there is no evidence that civil RICO
plaintiffs will show any restraint in the future, 530 and whether or not those
facing civil RICO actions will be considered part of an enterprise will still
depend on where the courthouse is located.
2. Constitutional Problems Demand Explicit Enterprise Definition
Further, consider the constitutionality of the matter. The canon of
constitutional avoidance and the rule of lenity warrant an ascertainablestructure requirement. 5 31
In recent years, the Supreme Court has
reemphasized a defendant's fundamental Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights
to have every essential element of a criminal offense determined by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. 532 As Fernich noted, "A construction that fuses
enterprise and pattern, effectively erasing enterprise from the statute,
therefore implicates fundamental rights and raises major constitutional
concerns." 533 And while it is true that defendants are aware of what actions
will violate the law and constitute the predicate acts under RICO-which
would normally end the "void for vagueness" analysis in the case of a
garden-variety crime-they are not aware of what associations may
constitute a RICO associated-in-fact enterprise. Nor could they be, when
the circuits are split three ways. Therefore, they are unaware what the
penalty for their actions-the RICO penalty or the garden-variety penaltywill be. 534 So the void for vagueness problem still remains. Moreover, a
lack of an ascertainable-structure requirement allows any plaintiff or U.S.

527. See supra notes 386-87 and accompanying text.
528. See supra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
529. United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 661 (8th Cir. 1982); supra note 250 and
accompanying text.
530. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
531. See supra note 377 and accompanying text.
532. See supra note 378 and accompanying text.
533. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 238, at 64.
534. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
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Attorney to dream up an "enterprise" that catches in its net actors who have
only the most attenuated, informal relationship-making this issue a
constitutional
problem for both defendant
(of notice) and
plaintiff/prosecutor (of overbroad and amorphous reach). 535 Surely, this
incredibly wide latitude must no longer be allowed. Were it not for the
discretion the U.S. Department of Justice has shown over the decades (as
Justice Marshall pointed out in Sedima),536 the Supreme Court may have
been forced to deal with this problem long ago.
Regarding the rule of lenity, Fernich correctly argues that an
interpretation of the ambiguous statute that imposes an ascertainable
structure will help defendants in this situation. 537 The proof requirement in
this situation is one that is spelled out explicitly for the defendant-that he
must be part of an enterprise with an ascertainable structure-and one that
does not subject him to possible Fifth Amendment concerns on void for
vagueness issues. 5 3 8 Even if this slightly narrows the scope of RICO
associated-in-fact enterprises, it does no violence to the statute or its liberal
construction clause. 539

Such a construction would avoid constitutional

doubt, and it "would not be the first time the Court
rejected an unbridled
540
view of RICO over liberal construction objection.
CONCLUSION

A tool originally designed to prevent organized crime from infiltrating
legitimate business has been used in all manners never contemplated by its
creators. It is important to continue to use RICO to punish racketeers both
criminally and civilly and as a deterrent for those who would engage in
racketeering activity. But likewise, there must be a balance of the need for
teeth in the statute with the potential dangers of RICO's overbreadth.
Moreover, the law must differentiate the racketeer from the common, ad
hoc criminal.
Since Turkette was decided in 1981, there has been no doubt that the
enterprise element must be proved separately from the pattern of
racketeering activity. Turkette, however, did not do enough to illuminate
what was needed to prove enterprise, resulting in a circuit split that has
finally wended its way back to the Supreme Court. A majority of circuits
have held that an enterprise must have an ascertainable structure separate
and distinct from the underlying predicate acts, and there is no evidence that
any problems have developed from this interpretation.
535. For vagueness concerns, see supra notes 172-81 and accompanying text.
536. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 502 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
537. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 238, at 66.
538. Id.; see also United States v. Santos, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008) (plurality opinion)
(noting that when the rule of lenity breaks statutory ties in favor of defendants, it is subjected
to "ambiguous criminal laws").
539. See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 238, at 66-67.
540. Id. at 67 (citing Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 463 (2006)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S.
170 186-87, 189 (1993) (Souter, J.,dissenting)).
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Boyle, then, represents a golden opportunity for the Supreme Court to
preserve RICO's important enterprise element by explicitly imposing an
ascertainable-structure proof requirement.

Notes & Observations

